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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION
DOROTHY BRIZILL, et al., Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF
ELECTIONS AND ETHICS, Defendant.
BARRY JERRELS, et al., Intervenor-Defendants
Civil Action No. 06ca 3939
Calendar 14
Judge Judith E. Retchin
Next Event: Initial Conference (9/15/06)
DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
Comes now the Defendant, District of Columbia Board
of Elections and Ethics by and through its undersigned counsel of
record and, pursuant to Superior Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6), hereby
moves this Court to dismiss this action on the grounds that the
complaint fails to state a claim against the Defendant upon which
relief can be granted. The legal and factual grounds supporting
this Motion to Dismiss are set forth in Defendant's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, which is attached hereto.
Respectfully submitted,
Kenneth J. McGhie,
General Counsel
Terry Stroud (D.C. Bar #465884)
Staff Attorney
D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics
441 4th Street,
NW, #270N
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 727-2194
Counsel for
Defendant
Date: May 25, 2006
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION
DOROTHY BRIZILL, et al., Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF
ELECTIONS AND ETHICS, Defendant.
BARRY JERRELS, et al., Intervenor-Defendants
Civil Action No. 06ca 3939
Calendar 14
Judge Judith E. Retchin
Next Event: Initial Conference (9/15/06)
DEFENDANT'S
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO
DISMISS
The District of Columbia Board of Elections and
Ethics, Defendant in this action, by undersigned counsel, herein
sets forth the Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion to
Dismiss filed today. As discussed further below, the Plaintiffs
have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 10, 2006, Barry Jerrels ("the
Proponent") submitted an initiative measure entitled the
"Video Lottery Terminal Initiative of 2006"
("Initiative Measure No. 69")1 to the D.C. Board of Elections and
Ethics
("the Board").2 On April 12, 2006, the Board sent
copies of Initiative Measure No. 69 and notice of the proper subject
hearing concerning the same to all members of the D.C.
Council, the Office of the D.C. Attorney General, and the Office of the General
Counsel
for the D.C. Council for comments on the validity of the
measure. On April 18, 2006, the D.C. Attorney General sent
correspondence to the Board indicating his opinion that
"[Initiative Measure No. 69] is a proper subject for an
initiative in the District." The General Counsel for the
D.C. Council submitted no comments regarding the validity
of the measure.3
Initiative Measure No. 69 was published in
the D.C. Register (Vol. 53 p. 3200) on April 21, 2006, along with
notice that a public proper subject hearing regarding Initiative Measure
No. 69 would be held during the Board's regularly scheduled
meeting on Wednesday, May 3, 2006, and that, if the measure
was accepted as a proper subject, the Board would also undertake
to formulate its short title and summary statement at that time.
On Wednesday, May 3, 2006, the Board conducted a proper subject
hearing on Initiative Measure No. 69. At that time, the Board heard
statements from interested parties, including the Plaintiffs, as to
whether Initiative Measure No. 69 was a proper subject of initiative.
After entertaining various objections to Initiative Measure No. 69 on proper subject grounds, the Board accepted the
measure as a proper subject on that date. After passing the motion
to accept Initiative Measure No. 69 as a proper subject of initiative,
the Board proceeded to draft the formulations for Initiative
Measure No. 69's short title and summary statement, taking
into consideration comments from all interested parties,
including the Plaintiffs. The Board's formulations were
published in the May 12, 2006 edition of the D.C. Register (Vol. 53
p. 4016).
On May 22, 2006, the Plaintiffs filed a
complaint with this Court, asking it to direct the Board to reject
Initiative Measure No. 69.
ARGUMENT
The Plaintiffs in this case ask this Court
to direct the Board to reject Initiative Measure No. 69 on
the grounds that "the Board should have held a separate and separately
advertised hearing to review the Short Title, Summary
Statement, and Legislative Text of the initiative that it
prepared" and that "[Initiative Measure No. 69] is not a
proper subject for an initiative[.]" Plaintiffs' Complaint
("Compl.") at 6. The specific proper subject claims put
forth by the Plaintiffs are that Initiative Measure No. 69
"(a) seeks to amend or overturn a federal law, which is
contrary both to the Home Rule Act and the U.S. Constitution; (b)
requires the appropriation of funds; and (c) seeks to exercise
mayoral authority, which violates the Home Rule Act." Compl.
at 4. In response, the Board asserts that Initiative Measure No.
69 meets all proper subject, formulation, and notice requirements
as set forth in the laws governing the initiative process of the
District of Columbia, and that it was processed in accordance with
such laws.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Plaintiffs in this matter have submitted to this Court a petition
for review of the Board's acceptance of, and formulations regarding,
Initiative Measure No. 69. They also seek a writ of mandamus directing the Board to
reject the same.
A. Petition for Review
The scope of review for this honorable Court
is limited. This Court should, consistent with the basic principles
of administrative law, defer to the Board's expertise, and give
great weight to the Board's interpretation of the statute and
regulations unless the Board's rationale is not supported
by substantial evidence and/or is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious. See Pendleton v. D. C. Board of Elections and Ethics,
449 A.2d 301, 307 (D.C. 1982). Moreover, in Allen v.
District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, 663 A.2d 489
(D.C. 1995), the D.C. Court of Appeals stated that "[i]nsofar
as the Board's legal conclusions are concerned, we must defer to
its interpretation of the statute which it administers, and,
especially of the regulations which it has promulgated, so long as
that interpretation is not plainly wrong or inconsistent with the
legislative purpose." Id., at 495.
B. Petition for Writ of
Mandamus
This jurisdiction recognizes that "[a] writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary writ and should only be used in
`exceptional circumstances'[.]" Stebbins v.
Stebbins,
673 A.2d 184,191 (D.C. App. 1996). The moving party must
"show that its right to the issuance of the writ is `clear
and indisputable'." Id. The Petitioner can not make
such a showing. Accordingly, the Petition should be denied.
II. THE BOARD'S CONSOLIDATION OF THE INITIATIVE
MEASURE NO. 69 PROPER SUBJECT AND SHORT TITLE AND SUMMARY
STATEMENT FORMULATION HEARINGS WAS PROPER
The D.C. Election Code charges the Board
with the responsibility of formulating the language of an
initiative measure that will appear on the ballot in an
election. To that end, the Board must "[p]repare a
true and impartial summary statement" which "express[es]
the purpose of the measure[,]" and which does not
"intentionally create prejudice for or against the
measure[.]" D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(c)(1). The Board must also
"[p]repare a short title for the measure" which will
allow voters to "identify readily the initiative ... measure
and to distinguish it from other measures which may appear on the
ballot[.]" D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(c)(2).
The Plaintiffs in this case have not alleged
that the Board failed in its formulation obligations under the
election statute; rather they assert that the Board failed to
properly advertise and hold the formulation hearing. The
Plaintiffs maintain that the Board is required to conduct a
"two-step process in which, after the Board approves an
initiative as a proper subject, it prepares its own Short Title,
Summary Statement, and Legislative Text[,] and that "[o]nly
then can it advertise the Short Title, Summary Statement, and
Legislative Text that it has prepared and hold a separate public
hearing on them." Compl. at 3.
The election act places no such temporal
restrictions on the Board. D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(c) provides that
the Board must formulate a short title and summary statement for
an initiative measure "[w]ithin 20 calendar days of the date
on which the Board accepts an initiative or referendum
measure[.]" It does not dictate that there is a set period of
time which must lapse between the date of the Board's acceptance
of a measure and the Board's formulation of that measure's short
title and summary statement. Instead, it merely provides a
statutory deadline by which the Board must have completed its
formulations. That is to say that, because the Board
formally accepted Initiative Measure No. 69 as a proper subject on May 3,
2006, it was legally obligated to formulate its short title and summary
statement no later than May 23, 2006. The Board has done exactly
that. The Board conducted the two-step process that the
Plaintiffs rightfully assert it is obligated to perform.
That it executed those two steps on the same day is no basis
whatsoever for rejecting the measure.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs do not - and can
not -- assert that there was not sufficient advance notice of
the Board's intent to conduct a consolidated hearing. As
stated earlier, the Board published notice of its intent to
conduct such hearing in the April 21, 2006 edition of the D.C. Register,
nearly two weeks prior to the hearing. The Plaintiffs were not
only apprised of the hearing in a timely fashion, but they
also attended and served as active participants in the proceedings
as well.
Interestingly, Plaintiff Brizill did not raise the
argument regarding the propriety of a consolidated hearing when
she challenged Initiative Measure No. 68, the "Video Lottery
Terminal Initiative of 2004" in this court, even though the
Board similarly held a consolidated hearing with respect to that
measure. See Argo v. D. C. Board of Elections and Ethics, Civil
Action No. 04-4740 (Super. Ct. June 29, 2004).
III. THE BOARD PROPERLY DECLINED TO ENTERTAIN
SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES TO THE LEGISLATIVE TEXT OF INITIATIVE
MEASURE NO. 69
Plaintiffs allege that the Board acted improperly
when it "refused to hear any testimony on the Legislative
Text of the initiative, and said that examination of the Legislative Text was beyond its
purview and
powers[.]" Compl. at 4. This claim must fail for two reasons:
1) the Board did not refuse to hear testimony on the
legislative form of Initiative Measure No. 69; and 2) the
Board is not empowered to make the changes to the legislative
text that were voiced at the hearing.
D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(c)(3) requires
the Board to "[p]repare in the proper legislative fond,
the proposed initiative or referendum measure ... which shall
conform to the legislative drafting format of acts
of the Council of the District of Columbia." This provision
speaks only to the form and not the substance of a proposed
measure. In fact, the Board is precluded from making all
but technical changes to an initiative measure prior to its
circulation. See Convention Center Referendum
Committee v. Board, 441 Aid 889, 900 (D.C. 198 1)( "Convention
Center")("The
Initiative Procedures Act interprets
[provision that the Board "shall submit an initiative
measure without alteration"] to permit the Board to make
technical, but not substantive, changes before circulation to
assure `proper legislative form. "')(citations omitted).
The testimony Plaintiffs presented to the Board at
the May 3, 2006 hearing concerning the legislative text had
nothing to do with the format of the measure, but rather with its
substance. Plaintiff Brizill sought to have the Board delete all
references within Initiative Measure No. 69 to the "Anacostia
Economic Development Corporation," and include a definition
that would specify the precise site of the Video Lottery Terminal
facility called for under the measure. These changes would amount
to more than the mere "technical changes" that the D.C.
Court of Appeals said were permitted in Convention Center. Accordingly,
the Board was justified in not making the alterations proposed by
Plaintiff Brizill; to have done so would have required the Board
to act in excess of its authority.
IV. INITIATIVE MEASURE NO. 69 IS A PROPER
SUBJECT OF INITIATIVE
The District of Columbia Code provides that
the Board must reject any proposed initiative measure which is
not a proper subject for an initiative.4
In making a proper subject determination, the Board analyzes,
inter alia, whether the measure would unlawfully
appropriate funds, negate or limit a budget request act,
and/or violate the provisions of either the D.C. Home Rule
Act or the D.C. Human Rights Act. If the Board dines that a measure
is proper in light of the governing law, it must accept the measure
and proceed to the next phase of the initiative process. Based
on its own analysis of the measure, as well as on the
comments received by the D.C. Office of the Attorney General and
the Office of the General Counsel for the D.C. Council, the Board properly
determined that Initiative Measure No. 69 is a proper subject
of initiative and, as such, may be presented to the voters for
their approval or disapproval.
A. Initiative Measure No. 69
does not amend or repeal a federal law that is national in scope
in contravention of the Home Rule Act
Plaintiffs argue that Initiative Measure No. 69 is not a proper
subject of initiative because it would amend or repeal the Johnson Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq.,5 and therefore
violate the Home Rule Act. Initiative Measure No. 69 would not amend,
repeal, or conflict with the Johnson Act, but rather is wholly
consistent with this law, and is therefore a proper subject of
initiative in the District of Columbia.
The Board recognizes that "[a]bsent express or
implied limitation, the power of the electorate to act by
initiative is coextensive with the power of the legislature to
adopt legislative measures," Convention Center, 441 A.2d
at 897 (D.C. 1981), and that, because the Home Rule Act precludes the D.C. Council from
legislating in certain areas, the electorate, too, is barred from
enacting laws in those areas. See D.C. Code § 1-206.02(a).
Thus, neither the D.C. Council nor the electorate may "[e]nact
any act, or enact any act to amend or repeal any Act of Congress,
which concerns the functions or property of the United States
or which is not restricted in its application exclusively in or to
the District[.]" D.C. Code § 1-206.02(a)(3). The
question this court must resolve, then, is whether Initiative Measure
No. 69 would amend or repeal a federal statute that is not limited
in application to the District, and thus be an improper
subject of initiative. The Board submits that it would not.
1. Initiative Measure No. 69
would not repeal the Johnson Act
The Gambling Devices Act provides that "[i]t
shall be unlawful knowingly to transport any gambling device to
any place in a State or a possession of the United States from any
place outside of such State or possession[.]" 15 U.S.C. §
1172(a). It exempts from its operation, however, the
transportation of gambling devices into states where such gambling
devices are specifically enumerated as lawful in a state statute. See
id. The Gambling Devices Act includes the District of Columbia
in the definition of the term "state." See 15
U.S.C. § 1171(b). Therefore, the Gambling Devices Act makes clear
that it permits the various states, as well as the District of
Columbia, to enact laws that legalize gambling and permit the use
of gambling devices.
Initiative Measure No. 69 is precisely the kind of
"state" statute that is contemplated by the exemption
provision of the Gambling Devices Act. It would amend the
District's current gaming law to authorize the licensing of Video
Lottery Terminals ("VLTs"). If enacted, entities that are
awarded licenses under Initiative Measure No. 69 would be
authorized to acquire and own certain VLTs, and would further be
allowed to install, maintain, and operate VLTs and conduct VLT
operations in the District of Columbia. With the passage of
Initiative Measure No. 69, there would be a District statute which
legalizes and permits the use of a particular gambling device, and
the District would thus be on par with other states that have
legalized gambling and that are, therefore, exempt from the
application of the Gambling Devices Act.
2. Initiative Measure No. 69
would not impact federal legislation which is "national"
in its reach
In 1962, when the Gambling Devices Act took effect,
Congress was still vested with exclusive legislative authority
over the District of Columbia. (The Home Rule Act, which was
passed to "relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon
essentially local matters,"6
would not be enacted until 1973.) In this respect, Congress'
relationship with the District was a unique one in that the former
held responsibility for governing the latter with respect to even
the most local of matters, such as street closings. The only other
jurisdictions that were subject to the same type of Congressional
dominion were federal possessions, such as Guam, Puerto Rico, and
the United States Virgin Islands. These jurisdictions, unlike the
states, were subject to a very particular brand of federal
authority, and it is therefore not surprising that they would have
been singled out in the Gambling Devices Act as locales in which the
possession and use of certain gambling devices was prohibited. See
15 U.S.C. § 1175.7
But it is precisely the fact that these particular
jurisdictions were enumerated in the Gambling Devices Act that
dictates that the provision making it unlawful to use or possess
certain gambling devices in the District is not national in its
reach, but is essentially a local law, and can therefore properly
be amended. Unlike the federal drug rehabilitation statute at
issue in McConnell v. United States, 537 A.2d 211 (D.C.
1988) that was applicable to federal defendants in every
jurisdiction in the United States, and therefore unsusceptible to
amendment or repeal via initiative, 15 U.S.C. § 1175 is limited
only to those jurisdictions over which the Congress maintains
ultimate legislative authority. It is, therefore, not
legislation which is national in scope, i.e., applicable in each
and every United States jurisdiction, and its amendment or repeal
- which, again, is not effected by Initiative Measure No. 69 - is
therefore proper under the Home Rule Act.
Finally, it must also be noted that courts in this
jurisdiction have recognized that "[pre-election
constitutional] review [of proposed initiatives] is
imprudent," Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 574 (D.C. 1997)("Hessey
1"), and that initiatives need not be "held
constitutional by either the Board or the Superior Court before
[they] may be classified as a `proper subject."' Id. It
is further recognized that "the court's jurisdiction should
be very sparingly exercised, and that in the great majority of
cases the court in its discretion should decline to consider
pre-election challenges to the constitutionality or legality of an initiative." Id.;
see also Committee for Volun. Prayer v. Wimberly, 704 A.2d
1199 (D.C. 1997).
This matter does not present the "extreme
case" in which a court would be acting appropriately and
efficiently by engaging in a pre-election constitutional review,
such as one in which an initiative proposed to establish a
particular religion as the District's official religion.
Initiative Measure No. 69 is devoid of such an obvious and
extreme affront to established constitutional principles.
Accordingly, this court should decline at this juncture to
entertain Plaintiffs' challenge to its legality.
B. Initiative Measure No. 69
does not appropriate funds
The Plaintiffs argue that Initiative Measure No. 69
is not a proper subject of initiative because it a law
appropriating funds. The Plaintiffs claim that this is so because
"the initiative imposes costs and expenses on the District of
Columbia and would require an appropriation of funds." Compi. at 5. These "costs and expenses" would arise, the
argument goes, because the "duties mandated, required, and
imposed by this initiative could clearly not be accomplished by
the Lottery Board with its present staff, expertise, equipment,
and resources." Id.
In proffering this argument, the Plaintiffs ignore
well-established legal precedent concerning initiatives that
elucidates that proponents of initiative measures may propose laws
that would establish new and substantive programs, but not the
funding for the programs. In the first case involving the
"law appropriating funds" exception to the right of
initiative, the D.C. Court of Appeals noted that the D.C. Council
adopted the exception out of a concern that "the electorate
not use the initiative to launch the appropriations process." Convention Center, 441 A.2d
at 912 (D.C. 1981). That court fully recognized that the Council intended that the initiative right
be used as a means by which the electorate could authorize
substantive programs, but that it did not intend for it to also
confer the authority to require the Council to seek funding for
such programs. Accordingly, it concluded that the exception serves
to prohibit "the electorate from using the initiative to: 1)
adopt a budget request act or make some other affirmative
effort to appropriate funds[.]" Id. at
913-914(emphasis added). The court also concluded, however, that
the exception was not intended to bar "initiatives
that would authorize (but not fund) a new project, ... or prohibit
future budget requests," id. at 893, and that it did
"not appear to proscribe initiatives with a prospective
fiscal effect only." Id. at 915.
It may very well be the case that Initiative
Measure No. 69 would require funding in order to
effectively achieve its purposes, i.e., have a "prospective
fiscal effect," but that fact is not sufficient to render it
an improper subject of initiative. Initiative Measure No. 69 must
be found to, by its terms, "intrude upon the discretion of
the Council to allocate District government revenues in the budget
process," Hessey v. Board of Elections and Ethics, 601 A.2d
3, 20 (D.C. 1991)("Hessey IF), by seeking to fund its
substantive program, notwithstanding the authority of the
District's elected officials to identify and allocate revenues,
and otherwise act as the guarantors of responsible fiscal
management in the District. Initiative Measure No. 69 does
not attempt to fund itself in any way. Therefore, it does not
violate the "laws appropriating funds" exception to the
initiative right.
C. Initiative Measure No.
69 does not encroach upon mayoral authority and thereby
conflict with the Home Rule Act
The Plaintiffs mount a "separation of
powers" attack on the Board's acceptance of Initiative
Measure No. 69, mischaracterizing its licensing procedure
as an infringement on the Mayor's licensing authority. By erroneously
assuming that the Council cannot require the Lottery Board to
award a license based in part on situs requirements through
legislation, the Plaintiffs also erroneously surmise that the
electorate cannot do so through initiative.
Hessey v. Burden, 584 A.2d 1 (D.C.
1990)("Hessey III") controls when the powers of
coordinate branches are allegedly in conflict under the terms of a
proposed initiative measure. Hessey III held that an
initiative that created an administrative agency with the
authority to appeal tax assessments by the Mayor did not
impermissibly infringe on the Mayor's responsibility for the
assessment of taxable property. The Court of Appeals engaged in
separation of powers analysis, and concluded "that the
responsibility for tax assessments conferred on the Mayor by
Congress is left essentially intact, and hence is not
impermissibly burdened, by the proposed initiative." Hessey
III, 584 A.2d at 6. "[T]he question was always whether a
particular measure impermissibly undermine[s]' the powers of the
Executive Branch, or disrupts the proper balance between the
coordinate branches [by] prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions[.]" Id.
(citations omitted). Initiative Measure No. 69 does not
undermine the Mayor's licensing authority because it is not an
executive or administrative prerogative as the Plaintiffs suggest,
but rather an imperative duty to award licenses to citizens who
fulfill legal qualifications.
The Plaintiffs take issue with situs as a legal
qualification for licensing; however, they fail to articulate how
the Mayor's authority is impinged upon and usurped. The Mayor is
still authorized to grant licenses based on the situs
qualifications. The situation is akin to the Mayor's inability to
refuse to award a lottery sales agent license to a legally qualified applicant. Essentially, the Mayor is not
hampered in his ability to carry out his duties.
The Council can always establish new licenses and
prescribe the qualifications necessary to obtain those licenses,
and the Mayor is vested with the responsibility of granting the
licenses to applicants that meet the legal requirements.
Initiative Measure No. 69 does not upset the balance between the
coordinate branches by placing a restrictive sites qualification
in light of its stated purpose.
CONCLUSION
Initiative Measure No. 69 complies with and fully
satisfies all applicable statutory requirements prescribed for the
initiative process in the District of Columbia. Accordingly, the
Planitiffs' request that this Court direct the D.C. Board of
Elections and Ethics to reject Initiative Measure No. 69 should be
denied, and the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs'
complaint should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Kenneth J. McGhie,
General Counsel
Terry Stroud (D.C. Bar #465884)
Staff Attorney
D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics
441 4th Street,
NW, #270N
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 727-2194
Counsel for
Defendant
Date: May 25, 2006
1. The short title of Initiative Measure No. 69 was
changed to the "Video Lottery Terminal Gambling Initiative of
2006" at the Board's formulation hearing on May 3, 2006.
2. The Proponent had previously
submitted another draft of Initiative Measure No. 69. This version
was withdrawn by the Proponent when it was brought to his
attention that the General Counsel for the D.C. Council had
concerns that the measure contained provisions that would render
the measure a "law appropriating funds" in violation of
District law governing initiatives. The current version of
Initiative Measure No. 69 no longer contains the provisions of the
original measure which were found to represent violations of
initiative law.
3. See
note 2 supra.
4. See D.C. Code § 1-1001.16(b)(1).
5. The
Johnson Act was amended in 1962 by the Gambling Devices Act, and
is now commonly referred to by that title. Hence, the terms
"Johnson Act" and "Gambling Devices Act" are
used interchangeably here.
6. D.C.
Code § 1-201.02(a).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1175 provides that "[i)t shall be
unlawful to manufacture, recondition, repair, sell, transport,
possess, or use any gambling device in the District of Columbia,
in any possession of the United States, within Indian country as
defined in section 1151 of title 18 or within the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States as defined in
section 7 of title 18, including on a vessel documented under
chapter 121 of title 46 or documented under the laws of a foreign
country."
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 25, 2006, copies of the foregoing
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss were delivered by hand to:
DOROTHY BRIZILL, 1327 Girard St. NW, Washington D.C. 20009
THELMA JONES, 2217 T Pl. S.E., Washington D.C. 20020
ANTHONY MUHAMMAD 1609 21st Pl. S.E. Washington D.C. 20001
BAACH ROBINSON & LEWIS PLLC, Jeffery D. Robinson, Esq. 1201 F St.
N.W., Suite 500, Washington D.C. 20004-1225
Terry D. Stroud
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION
DOROTHY BRIZILL, et al., Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF
ELECTIONS AND ETHICS, Defendant.
BARRY JERRELS, et al., Intervenor-Defendants
Civil Action No. 06ca 3939
Calendar 14
Judge Judith E. Retchin
Next Event: Initial Conference (9/15/06)
ORDER
Upon consideration of Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support
thereof, the record herein, and for good cause shown, it is
hereby:
ORDERED, that the Motion should be, and is
hereby GRANTED.
Superior
Court Judge Judith E. Retchin
Copies to: DOROTHY BRIZILL, 1327 Girard St. NW, Washington D.C. 20009
Tel. and Fax. (202) 234-6982
THELMA JONES, 2217 T Pl. S.E., Washington D.C. 20020
ANTHONY MUHAMMAD 1609 21st Pl. S.E. Washington D.C. 20001
Jeffrey D. Robinson, Esq., BAACH ROBINSON & LEWIS PLLC, 1201 F St.
N.W., Suite 500, Washington D.C. 20004-1225 Tel.: (202) 833-8900 Fax:
(202) 466-5738
Terri D. Stroud, DC Board of Elections and Ethics One Judiciary
Square 441 4th Street,
NW, Suite 270N Washington, DC 20001 Tel.: (202) 727-2194 Fax:
(202) 628-5952
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