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Congressman Paul Gillmor, 5th District, Ohio
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| FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Monday, March 15, 2004 |
Contact: Geoffrey Basye Phone: (202) 225-6405 |
WASHINGTON, DC – Paul Gillmor (R-OH), Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials, today announced that his subcommittee is launching a wide-ranging effort to better understand the occurrence of elevated levels of lead in the drinking water for the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.
Gillmor heads a subcommittee in the U.S. House of Representatives that has prime jurisdiction over the Safe Drinking Water Act. He is calling for an inquiry into whether there were violations of this law and has directed letters to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Washington, D.C. Water and Sewer Authority (WASA). Gillmor also is asking the General Accounting Office (GAO) to begin an independent inquiry into the operation of WASA and the Washington Aqueduct, operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the notice that was given to the public concerning test results showing elevated levels of lead.
The primary sources of lead in drinking water are lead pipe, lead-based solder used to connect pipe in plumbing systems, and brass plumbing fixtures that contain lead. Even though lead levels in children have decreased 86 percent over the last 25 years, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that approximately 20 percent of a person’s exposure to lead can come from drinking water. In addition, the Centers for Disease Control considers the ingestion of lead a serious public health concern for children, pregnant women, and people with compromised immune systems.
"My prime concern is that the public health is protected," Gillmor said. "We need to gather all the information before making any final decisions or conclusions, but with some of D.C.’s lead levels approaching 20 times the safe limit set by the EPA, I am inclined to believe this was not so much a failure of law, but of persons.
In August 2002, WASA indicated to EPA that it had a 90th percentile value of 75 parts-per-billion (ppb) of lead in drinking water. The lead action level in 2003 was also twice reported to have exceeded 40 ppb (for the first six months) and 63 ppb (for the last six months). "I am troubled by the evident lack of follow up and common sense in not immediately informing those affected by elevated lead levels in their water," Gillmor stated. "It should not take much forethought to tell someone their drinking water contains lead levels which are grossly over the level established by EPA."
Almost 20 years ago, Congress, in the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, took aggressive steps to address the dangers of lead in drinking water by effectively banning the use of new lead solder and leaded pipes from public water supply systems and plumbing, as well as limiting faucets and other brass plumbing components to no more than eight percent lead content.
"We also need to make sure the drinking water problems in D.C. are not a national phenomenon," Gillmor said. "That is why I am asking for a review of the specific efforts undertaken by WASA and the Washington Aqueduct." Gillmor noted in his letters to EPA and WASA that WASA was one of four major drinking water utilities serving over a population of 1.1 million that had historical problems exceeding the 15 ppb action level for lead – including three instances between January 1992 and 1994 and three instances since 2002. According to information received by his subcommittee, while the other three systems have been back under the lead action level for the last 2 years or longer, WASA has not.
Mr. Glenn S. Gerstell
Chairman and Principal Member
Board of Directors
District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority
5000 Overlook Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20032
Dear Mr. Gerstell:
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce has jurisdiction over public health, including the Safe Drinking Water Act. The discovery of elevated levels of lead in drinking water supplied by the Water and Sewer Authority (WASA) to the District of Columbia and the suburbs of Northern Virginia is therefore a great cause for concern to the Committee. Even though lead levels in children have decreased 86 percent over the last 25 years, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that approximately 20 percent of a person’s exposure to lead can come from drinking water. In addition, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention considers the ingestion of lead a serious public health concern for children, pregnant women, and people with compromised immune systems.
As you are aware, the primary sources of lead in drinking water are lead pipes, lead-based solder used to connect pipe in plumbing systems, and brass plumbing fixtures that contain lead. Almost 20 years ago, Congress, in the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, took aggressive steps to address the dangers of lead in drinking water by effectively banning the use of new lead solder and leaded pipes from public water supply systems and plumbing, as well as limiting faucets and other brass plumbing components to no more than eight percent lead content. The Committee is exploring what additional legislative or regulatory measures, if any, are necessary to prevent situations like those confronting the District and Northern Virginia. Accordingly, pursuant to Rules X and XII of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, please respond to the following requests by April 15, 2004.
All steps taken by WASA to comply with regulations promulgated under the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, as well as any associated guidance, to reduce lead levels in finished water delivered to consumers, specifically: (a) What quantity of lead drinking water service lines, expressed in numbers replaced per year and as a percentage of the total number of existing lead service lines, has WASA replaced each of the last 12 years? (b) How much has WASA spent in this effort utilizing its own revenues? (c) How much money has been utilized using distributions made under the Drinking Water State Revolving Loan Fund, any other grants or any other financing occurring at below market interest rates?
It is my understanding that the actual number of lead service lines in the District of Columbia is unknown and that the oft-cited 23,000 lead service lines is an estimate based on a combination of field work and probability analysis. This would at least raise the possibility of cases of lead contamination that might not be detected. Are there any effective methods by which WASA could more accurately determine the extent of lead service lines? How important is such knowledge to resolving concerns over lead exposure? In what areas could WASA replacement and maintenance activities be improved, if such improvement is needed?
Other than lead, are there any other drinking water contaminants which WASA either has had to address over the last 12 years--or is concerned about in the future – related to the deterioration of its drinking water supply system?
In 1996, after 58 years in existence, WASA was refashioned by the Federal and District of Columbia governments into a semi-autonomous regional entity. I would like to understand if there are any organizational or operational issues with regard to the current local structure supporting the delivery of safe drinking water in the District of Columbia and the affected Virginia suburbs.
WASA was one of four major drinking water utilities serving over a population of 1.1 million that had historical problems exceeding the 15 parts-per-billion (ppb) action level for lead – including three instances between January 1992 and 1994 and three instances since 2002. What efforts were taken to by WASA and the Washington Aqueduct Division of the Army Corps of Engineers (Washington Aqueduct) to assess any connection between exceedences of the action level for lead and the water treatment process in each instance since 1992? How do WASA’s efforts compare with efforts made in the other three systems?
On August 27, 2002, WASA indicated to EPA that it had a 90th percentile value of 75 ppb of lead in drinking water. The lead action level was also twice reported exceeded at 40 ppb for the first six months of 2003 and 63 ppb for the last six months of 2003. Aside from WASA being required to engage in more frequent monitoring due to the exceedences of the action level, what other steps did WASA and the Washington Aqueduct take during 2002 and 2003 to analyze and address such high recorded lead levels? Please provide the associated dates on which such action was taken.
If the optimal corrosion control treatment (OCCT) that is thought to have contributed to elevated lead readings in the District of Columbia was consistently implemented throughout this period – why would WASA’s lead concentration levels at the 90th percentile drop in early 2003 only to rise 50 percent just six month later? Could such wide swings in lead detection levels be a result of insufficient test data, even under increased monitoring? If not, what other factors could cause such a wide swing in monitoring results?
EPA has recently asked WASA to take several actions, including testing all service lines, speeding up public notification of drinking water sampling at individual residences, and conveying a stronger sense of urgency in its public communications on this matter. Does WASA disagree that its previous public notification efforts were inadequate? In the future, how soon after test results have been verified will individual home and business owners be notified of lead concentrations levels above 15 ppb? As of December 31, 2003, WASA collected a cumulative total of 6,000 lead service line water samples. Has WASA, as of the date of this letter, informed all homeowners and businesses where samples exceeded the EPA action level of 15ppb? How long, on average, did WASA take between receiving test results and informing homeowners and businesses of results that exceeded 15ppb? What is the longest period of time that elapsed before WASA, after receiving results exceeding 15ppb, contacted the individual homeowner or business served by the water line from which the sample was drawn?
Finally, I would like to turn my attention to the relationship between WASA and the Washington Aqueduct. It is my understanding that the Washington Aqueduct is responsible for all corrosion control for its three customer systems and WASA is in charge of monitoring lead and copper at its retail customer’s taps. As such, I would like to know:
What actions did WASA take to communicate lead levels it experienced to the Washington Aqueduct in each instance results exceeded action levels since 1992? What response, if any, did the Washington Aqueduct take in each instance with regard to the communication of these results?
In Congressional testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform on March 5, 2004, EPA Regional Administrator Donald Welsh indicated that during the 1990s, WASA, the Washington Aqueduct and EPA worked to create an optimal corrosion control treatment (OCCT) protocol for drinking water supplied by the Aqueduct. Mr. Welsh also stated that the OCCT initially appeared to be a success in reducing lead exposures. What structural or operational factors or processes contributed to the later failure of the OCCT?
EPA Regional Administrator Walsh’s March 5, 2004 testimony referenced above also suggests that WASA’s extensive replacement of 18,000 water meters in 2001 and 2002 contributed to elevated lead levels. What does WASA believe is the relationship, if any, between the replacement of these water meters and elevated corrosiveness? Did WASA inform the Washington Aqueduct of its meter replacement efforts? Please explain the extent of any information provided to the Washington Aqueduct concerning this effort.
One year ago, WASA began a lead service line sampling program that revealed 75 percent of the water lines tested leeched lead levels above EPA’s 15 ppb action level. What role, if any, did the Washington Aqueduct play in the assessment of this data?
Since 1992, on how many occasions has WASA "invalidated" or otherwise not communicated the full and complete results of its lead testing program to EPA Region III? Does WASA believe it has authority to "invalidate" results? Does WASA believe EPA has authority to waive or otherwise not accept less than full and complete monitoring results for lead?
For any other contaminant regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act has either WASA directly, or in conjunction with the Washington Aqueduct, "invalidated" any data that should have been submitted to EPA Region III? In any instance, has either WASA directly, or in conjunction with the Washington Aqueduct reported less than full and complete monitoring results to EPA Region III?
Thank you for your consideration of these matters. I know we all share a commitment not only to a clean and safe environment, but also to policies and actions that promote and ensure public health. I look forward to your expeditious reply.
Sincerely,
Paul E. Gillmor
Chairman
Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials
PEG/gsc
The Honorable Benjamin Grumbles
Acting Administrator, Office of Water
United States Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
Dear Mr. Grumbles:
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce has broad jurisdiction over public health, including the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials, I have become increasingly concerned regarding exceedences of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) action level for lead in the drinking water system serving Washington, D.C. and parts of Northern Virginia.
As you are aware, the primary sources of lead in drinking water are lead pipe, lead-based solder used to connect pipe in plumbing systems, and brass plumbing fixtures that contain lead. Almost 20 years ago, Congress, in the SDWA Amendments of 1986, took aggressive steps to address the dangers of lead in drinking water by effectively banning the use of new lead solder and leaded pipes from public water supply systems and plumbing, as well as limiting faucets and other brass plumbing components to no more than eight percent lead content.
In 1996, the District of Columbia and EPA fashioned the Washington, D.C. Water and Sewer Authority (WASA) into a semi-autonomous regional entity. WASA’s responsibilities included distributing drinking water safely to the residents of the District, as well as some facilities directly across the Potomac in Virginia. However, with lead contamination problems evident in the District’s drinking water, there is new concern over the organizational and operational structure of WASA, as well as its relationship to the other entities. In testimony before Congress on March 5, 2004, EPA Regional Administrator Donald Welsh indicated that WASA had exceeded the 15 parts per billion (ppb) action level for lead at the 90th percentile for taps monitored during six out of the fifteen reporting periods since January 1992. In other words, at some locations in the District, and perhaps in Northern Virginia, the action level for lead may have been exceeded fully 40% of the time. Accordingly, pursuant to Rules X and XII of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, please respond to the following requests and questions by April 15, 2004.
News reports and Congressional testimony received to date have raised issues with respect to compliance with the SDWA. Based on the available information, has EPA determined whether violations have occurred? If EPA has not made such a determination, by what date will such a determination be made? If EPA does find that violations of the SDWA have occurred, what actions to address such violations are available to the Agency to address such violations?
As your testimony of March 5, 2004 before the House Government Reform Committee indicated, WASA was one of four major drinking water utilities serving over a population of 1.1 million that had historical problems exceeding the 15 ppb action level for lead – including three instances between January 1992 and 1994 and three times since 2002. What efforts were taken by EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers to assess any connection between exceedences of the action level for lead and the water treatment process in each instance since 1992? How do WASAs and the Army Corps of Engineer’s efforts compare to efforts made in the other three systems? In your opinion, are there any organizational and management issues concerning WASA and the Army Corps of Engineers which could affect the ability to deliver safe drinking water meeting federal standards to customers in the District of Columbia and Northern Virginia?
What surveillance programs exist in the District of Columbia area, as well as nationally, which would indicate increased levels of lead in the most susceptible populations? Has any existing surveillance program, or other data, indicated that childhood blood levels have been adversely affected, or have perceptively increased, due to lead exposure through drinking water in the District of Columbia or elsewhere?
Please provide the Subcommittee with details concerning your work with the National Nursing Centers Consortium on lead prevention programs as well as any efforts involving EPA, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, and the Pediatric Environmental Health Specialty Unit on similar programs.
EPA Region III has asked WASA to test all service lines, speed up public notification of drinking water sampling at individual residences, convey a stronger sense of urgency in its public communications on this matter, and accelerate the replacement of lead service lines. Are there any impediments, legal or otherwise, that would preclude WASA from full compliance with these actions?
To what extent has the disinfection byproducts rule and other SDWA rules affected treatment options for the District of Columbia and elsewhere? To what extent have such treatment options posed challenges for compliance with other SDWA Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) and action levels in the District of Columbia and elsewhere? To what extent is it possible that compliance with such rules could be responsible for elevated lead levels in the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions served by the Washington Aqueduct?
From available information presented to date, there appears to be some uncertainty with regard to the number of lead service lines in the District of Columbia. What is your understanding of the information WASA has with respect to the location and composition of its distribution system? Is such information comparable in scope and quality to other systems of comparable size? What are the implications of having less than adequate data concerning a drinking water distribution system?
Characterize the general integrity of the Washington, D.C. water system. What statistical or other information is available with regard to any possible loss of water, cross-contamination, residual disinfection levels, or other matters that could affect the safe delivery of water? How does this information compare to other systems of a similar size and age?
What other possible health impacts may be associated with the deterioration of a drinking water supply system, in particular cast iron and other pipes utilized by WASA? How does the SDWA and rules promulgated under the Act address such impacts?
During the 1990s, WASA, the Army Corps of Engineers and EPA worked to create an optimal corrosion control treatment (OCCT) protocol for drinking water supplied by the WASA. According to Congressional testimony by EPA Regional Administrator Donald Welsh on March 5, 2004 before the House Government Reform Committee, the OCCT initially appeared to be a success in reducing lead exposures. What structural or operational factors or processes are you assessing which may have contributed to the later failure of the OCCT? What conclusions have you reached to date concerning any structural or operational factors that may have contributed to the later failure of the OCCT? What application will this review of the OCCT have to other large metropolitan systems?
In 1991, EPA required medium and large systems to conduct initial rounds of drinking water monitoring by December 2002. Eleven percent of medium sized systems and thirteen percent of the largest systems were not in compliance for lead exposure. What have such systems done over the last ten years to reduce these numbers and what is the current compliance rate? How do these efforts compare to efforts undertaken by WASA and the Washington Aqueduct?
Mr. Welsh’s March 5, 2004 Congressional testimony referenced above also indicates that EPA plans to spend $8 million in April 2004 in grant funds and $3.7 million in prior years funding to expedite the replacement of District of Columbia’s drinking water lines. How typical is this kind of direct grant expenditure for the replacement of lead service lines? What do you expect to be the total cost of the replacement program over the next two years and what do you anticipate WASA’s contribution to be regarding this amount?
What administrative orders, if any, have been issued to WASA or the Washington Aqueduct in the past under section 1414 or 1431 of the SDWA? If found necessary under the terms and conditions outlined in section 1414 or 1431 of the SDWA, are there any limitations on EPA’s ability to issue administrative orders directly to either WASA or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers?
Thank you for your consideration of these matters. I know we all share a commitment not only to a clean and safe environment, but also to policies and actions that promote and ensure public health. I look forward to your expeditious reply.
Sincerely,
Paul E. Gillmor
Chairman
Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials
PEG/gsc
The Honorable David M. Walker
Comptroller General
United States General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548
Dear Mr. Walker:
The House Energy and Commerce Committee has broad jurisdiction over public health matters, including the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Recently, significant questions have been raised regarding lead levels contained in the drinking water system serving Washington, D.C. and parts of Northern Virginia. To help the Committee understand the root causes of the District of Columbia’s drinking water problems and to better understand how to prevent future occurrences of unhealthy levels of contaminants in drinking water, please review and assess the follow areas.
The current arrangement of authority for the Washington, D.C. metropolitan water supply appears to consist of several semi-independent entities: (a) the Water and Sewer Authority (WASA), a semiautonomous regional entity, is responsible for distributing water to the District and several federal facilities in Virginia; (b) the US Army Corps of Engineers, through the Washington Aqueduct, is responsible for treatment and filtering issues; and (c) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region III Office in Philadelphia has primary enforcement responsibilities under the SDWA. In addition, consultations with EPA’s Office of Water have indicated that if EPA needed to issue administrative orders under Section 1431 of the SDWA to address any emergency situations, such orders would be need to be directed to the Mayor’s Office for the District of Columbia.
Please review the current structure of WASA in relation to EPA Region III, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at the Washington Aqueduct, and the Mayor’s Office and District Government. What is the level of coordination among these entities with respect to compliance with SDWA regulations? How might this current structure be improved to increase efficiency and accountability?
Under EPA’s management of SDWA, public outreach and notice are important parts of educating drinking water consumers not only about the current types of contaminants treated by their drinking water delivery system, but also in alerting them to serious public health threats posed by the use of their drinking water. In the current situation, there have been widespread complaints concerning delay in notifying consumers that water delivered to their homes exceeded lead action levels, in some cases by many orders of magnitude.
How have other states and drinking water utilities, especially those states or utilities that have had past problems with exceeding the action level for lead, conducted notification of their customers?
Please have your staff contact Bob Meyers, Tom Hassenboehler, or Jerry Couri of the Committee’s staff at (202) 225-2927 to discuss GAO’s work on this study.
Sincerely,
Paul E. Gillmor
Chairman
Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials
PEG/gsc
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