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Council of the District of Columbia
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FY 00 Actual |
FY 01 Budget |
FY 02 Mayor |
FY 02 Committee |
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Local Funds |
$297,327 |
$283,285 |
$297,027 |
$297,027 |
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Total Funds |
313869 |
305447 |
316139 |
316139 |
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Capital Funds |
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$46,299,000 |
$46,299,000 |
The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) seeks to prevent crime and the fear of crime, and to work with others to build safe and healthy neighborhoods throughout the District of Columbia. MPD is working to achieve these goals through a community policing strategy called "Policing for Prevention."
MPD’s "Policing for Prevention" strategy is implemented through a suite of municipal policing activities including direct service provision (Regional Operations), support activities (Corporate Support), and administrative functions (Chief of Police).
The Regional Operations branch, which receives 65% of MPD’s budget, consists of three Regional Operations Commands (ROCs) – ROC North, ROC Central and ROC East – which oversee seven police districts. The police districts are made up of 83 Police Service Areas (formerly called Patrol Service Areas, or PSAs), which are geographic units policed by teams of officers commanded by PSA lieutenants. Each police district also has an investigative and support staff. Regional Operations also includes executive leadership, the 911/311 Emergency Communications Division and special services functions. Special services include forensic science, court liaison, special investigations, youth and prevention services, executive protection for the Mayor and visiting dignitaries, and the Special Operations Division (SOD). SOD includes the harbor patrol, canine officers, the helicopter unit, emergency response team, explosive ordinance team and presidential escorts.
Corporate Support, which receives 29% of MPD’s budget, provides administrative, equipment, and human resources support for Regional Operations. Corporate Support activities include facilities management, fleet maintenance, implementing and maintaining information technology systems, and recruiting and equipping officers.
The Office of the Chief of Police, which receives 6% of MPD’s budget, provides direction to Corporate Support and Regional Operations. The office includes the office of organizational development, professional responsibility, corporate communications, the office of the general counsel, the chief financial officer and the immediate office of the Chief of Police.
MPD achieved two out of four Scorecard Goals:
Out of its 20 FY 2000 Agency Performance Goals and Targets, MPD achieved only five goals, did not achieve six goals, was unable to measure nine goals, and has subsequently dropped 17 of the 20 goals as targets for CY 2001 and FY 2002 performance goals:
MPD achieved all four of the goals from the FY 2000 Operating Budget and Financial Plan:
Finally, MPD testified that it accomplished tasks above and beyond those related to its performance goals:
The Committee has concerns not only about MPD’s low success rate in terms of performance goals, but also about the structure and consistency of those goals. As is apparent from the Committee’s review of MPD’s performance, some of these goals overlap with each other while others do not, some are easily quantifiable while others are not, and some can be measured consecutively over a number of years while others cannot.
Further, the fact that MPD is dropping 17 of its 20 FY 2000 Agency Performance Goals and Targets raises serious questions about MPD’s commitment to fairly and steadily measuring its own performance. The Committee believes that quantifiable goals related to 911/311 response time, crime reduction rates for specific categories of crime, and surveys of citizen confidence in the MPD, are appropriate, challenging and transparent performance goals. Chief Ramsey, in testimony before the Committee, acknowledged the need for clear and consistent performance goals. The Committee intends to continue to monitor the MPD’s performance using these kinds of measures.
The Committee’s comments about following the statutory guidelines on agency performance set out in the Government Managers Accountability Act (GMAA) in the beginning of this report, apply to the MPD.
During a March 22, 2001 hearing before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Chief Ramsey testified that the MPD’s FY 2000 performance goals, including the goals to reduce violent and property crime by 5%, were "stretch goals, deliberately set high to give our members and the community something to strive for." The Committee commends MPD for this approach.
Nevertheless, the Committee is considerably troubled by some of the MPD’s FY 2002 goals. Performance Measures 1.1 and 1.2, for example, aim to reduce property and violent crime by only 2% each year over the next three fiscal years. The Committee questions why this measure has been reduced to 2% from last fiscal year’s goal of 5% and FY 1999’s goal of a 3% reduction in each category. The Committee also notes that violent and property crime rates have been falling in the District at a rate considerably greater than 2%. According to the same budget documents that lay out Performance Measures 1.1 and 1.2, property crime was reduced in the District by 12.5% in FY 1999 and by 6.3% in FY 2000, and violent crime was reduced by 11.3% in FY1999 and by 2.6% in FY 2000. These reductions are consistent with crime decreases in recent years in similarly sized cities. It seems somewhat of an under-achievement, then, to reduce violent and property crime only 2% over the next three years. The Committee agrees with William J. Bratton’s statement that "[g]oals, it turns out, are an extremely important part of lifting [an] . . . organization to higher levels of accomplishment and revitalizing an organizational culture" (Great Expectations: How Higher Expectations for Police Departments Can Lead to a Decrease in Crime, 1995). The Committee recommends that the MPD to reconsider its goal of a 2% reduction in these categories.
Investigative closure rates are an important measure of the performance of police departments. The Committee and the public have, in particular, paid a tremendous amount of attention recently to the MPD’s homicide closure rate (see the Committee on the Judiciary’s February 27, 2001 Oversight Report on the Metropolitan Police Department’s Homicide Investigative Practices and Case Closure Rate). As the Committee’s report on this issue states:
"There are few responsibilities more important for a government than homicide investigation, because there is no greater affront to a community or its residents than the taking of a human life. The only affront that compares to the taking of a life is the failure of government to assure a commensurate response to murder, with thorough and timely and caring investigation" (p.1).
Indeed, statistics related to the total number of homicides and their closure rates are some of the most instructive measures used to assess the overall performance of police departments. These statistics help evaluate not only police departments’ investigative capacity, but also the success of their crime prevention strategies, the strength of their supervisory structure, and the depth of confidence in police departments held by the citizens they serve.
The Committee, therefore, commends MPD for its Performance Measurement 2.1 to increase its homicide clearance rate to 65% in FY 2001 and 67% in FY 2002, as well as its goal to end calendar year 2001 with fewer than 200 homicides (according to Chief Ramsey’s March 23, 2001 oral testimony). The Committee will continue to monitor the MPD’s homicide closure rate, as well as the overall quality of homicide investigations and the effectiveness of the MPD’s investigative model, throughout Council Period XIV.
The Committee remains concerned, though, that the MPD does not, in any official capacity, monitor the closure rates of any crimes other than homicides. In an answer to a question on this issue posed by Committee Member Sharon Ambrose in preparation for the Committee’s January 25th hearing on the MPD’s homicide closure rate, MPD stated that:
"Clearance rates for every Part I crime over the last ten years are not readily available. The MPD is confirming the validity of these rates and will provide an update as soon as possible."
The Committee finds this answer unacceptable for a number of reasons. First, MPD has stated that part of its rationale for decentralizing crime investigations and for assigning detectives "violent crime" and "property crime" caseloads, rather than caseloads consisting of more specific types of crime, was to improve closure rates for all crimes by identifying and increasing linkages between crime categories. It should follow, then, that the MPD, as part of its evaluation of the effectiveness of its investigative model and the work of its detectives, should monitor closure rates for categories of crime beyond homicides.
Secondly, despite falling crime statistics in recent years, rates of all categories of crime remain a concern in District neighborhoods and of the District government. District residents continue to be victimized by crime every day and deserve to know about the rate at which the perpetrators of all crimes are being brought to justice. The extent and quality of the MPD’s follow-up on crimes such as robberies and burglaries, for example, is a frequent concern voiced by residents at PSA meetings and during Council hearings. The Committee believes that the District cannot afford to have its residents assume that bringing traumatic personal events, such as sexual assaults and armed robberies, to closure is not a priority of the MPD or of the District government. This issue affects the credibility residents place in their police department and criminal justice system. The Committee agrees with Chief Ramsey's statement during the Committee’s March 23, 2001 hearing that "[e]nhancing customer satisfaction is, in many ways, tied to improving our criminal investigations."
Third, the Committee has learned through informal conversations with MPD command staff, specifically District Commanders, that some police districts do, in fact, monitor their detectives’ closure rates for crimes aside from homicides. The Committee also notes that, presumably because of requirements related to Section III of the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) requirements, the MPD’s 1999 Annual Report includes an analysis of arrests for each type of Index and Non-Index crime. This suggests that the MPD does have some kind of mechanism in place to track arrest and closure data. The Committee is confident that, through its police district personnel, the MPD has the capacity to monitor all closure rates, at least for Part I crimes, and encourages the MPD to begin moving in the direction of monitoring closure rates for crimes aside from homicides.
For these reasons, the Committee requests that the MPD, starting in June of 2001, monitor the closure rates for sexual assaults, robberies and burglaries (1 and 2), by police district. The Committee requests that the MPD report back to the Committee on the monthly closure rates for these crimes, by police district, for the months of June – January 2002, during its February 2002 performance oversight hearing.
The Committee commends the MPD for the direction it appears to be taking with Performance Measures 3.1 and 3.2., which call for a reduction in calls for service for public disorder and for drug activity. The Committee applauds these performance measures as recognition of the fact that traditional methods of evaluating crime trends have caused drug-related and "quality of life" disorder crime to fall below the radar screen of the MPD’s statistical analysis in past years. While the 2% reduction goals over the next three years are low, the Committee understands that the MPD is in the early stages of measuring drug related crime in this way and urges the MPD to reconsider the percentage once baseline statistics for these kinds of calls for service are established.
There has been extensive discussion among experts on how the community policing movement has forced police departments to reassess traditional ways of measuring police performance (Measuring What Matters: A Policing Research Institute, National Institute of Justice/Office of Community Oriented Policing, 1995). Traditional methods of measuring crime and police performance have focused on reported Part I crimes, namely UCR statistics. Part I crimes include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, auto theft and arson. While the Committee appreciates the importance of monitoring Part I crimes, the Committee agrees with community policing expert George Kellig’s statement that:
Lawlessness consists not just in the relatively rare "index" crimes counted by the FBI, but can also refer to an atmosphere of disorder in which it seems like these and less serious crimes and harassments might occur at any time. Lawlessness locks neighbors behind doors, chases store owners off streets, shuts down business, and spreads poverty and despair. (Measuring What Matters: A New Way of Thinking About Crime and Public Order, 1995)
Community policing emphasizes the abatement of disorder crimes, for example, drug activity, prostitution, noise, disorderly behavior, and so forth. Indeed, it is the Committee’s view that the concerns raised by District residents at PSA meetings, particularly in areas with persistent drug related activity, are not addressed by Part I crime statistics. This is consistent with what studies of community policing programs across the country have found (Skogan, 1995, Measuring What Matters: Crime, Disorder, and Fear).
The Committee commends the MPD for the progress it has made over the past three years with the Partnership for Problem Solving component of its Policing for Prevention strategy, and believes that a genuine community policing structure has been successfully established in the District. The Committee urges the MPD to now begin to measure the performance of its crime prevention programs in creative ways that represent a departure from performance measurement based solely on reported Part I crimes. One way of doing so is to conduct survey measures of disorder which assess citizens’ fear of crime, visibility of police, and the quality of police service in neighborhoods (Skogan, 1995). The Committee notes that these kinds of customer satisfaction surveys are included in MPD’s 1999 Annual Report and that Performance Measure 5.1. for FY 2002 will measure the "percent of residents reporting that the police do a very good job or good job assisting victims of crime." The Committee urges MPD to use similar citizen surveys to assess its performance with respect to specific policing initiatives in particular neighborhoods.
The Committee is particularly interested in how the MPD evaluates the effectiveness of its drug enforcement initiatives, specifically the work of the Narcotics Strike Force and the Capital Communities program. The Committee notes that MPD’s performance goals for FY 2001 and FY 2002 include "closing at least six open air drug markets," and is interested in how MPD will evaluate whether or not it has achieved that goal. The information MPD provided the Committee on the results of operations conducted by the Narcotics Strike Force in the Fifth District, for example, emphasized the total number of arrests made, warrants served, and seizures recovered (drugs and money). The summary provided to the Committee noted that "[t]he operation’s results were measured by the reduction of narcotic offenses, narcotic related offenses, and drug related calls for service in the target areas."
The Committee commends the evaluation of drug related calls for service as part of the MPD’s assessment of the Strike Force operation as a welcome departure from MPD’s tendency in the past to measure drug enforcement operations with Part I statistics. The Committee notes, for example, that during testimony in front of the Committee on February 14, 2000 regarding the Capital Communities program, Chief Ramsey stated that "these six capital communities have experienced a 15% reduction in reported crime, slightly higher than the city-wide level."
The Committee is aware that MPD is in the process of enhancing its Capital Community program through the federal Byrne Grant Program. While researching
Byrne Discretionary Grant Funds, the Committee noted that part of the Grant Funds’ requirements include that the participating state provide matching local funds for the grant (Chapter 2.5a), that the state legislature participate in a review of the program being funded by the grant (Chapter 3.1d), and that the state’s program include a comprehensive evaluation plan (Chapter 6). This evaluation plan is to have "clearly articulated goals and objectives, including realistic and adequate performance measures developed at the outset of the program." The Committee looks forward to learning more about these components of the MPD’s Capital Communities program planned for FY 2001 and FY 2002.
As part of the Committee’s federally required review of the program, the Committee requests that in all six of the Capital Communities being targeted with Byrne grant funds, the following be measured at the beginning and end of the program:
The Committee requests that the MPD report back to the Committee on the status of this evaluation during its February 2002 performance oversight hearing.
The Committee also recommends that the MPD develop methods of evaluating the performance of individual members of the Department in ways that reflect the overall goals of community policing referenced by this section of the Committee's report. For example, it is the Committee's understanding that, typically, a PSA Lieutenant's performance evaluation is based solely on Part I crime statistics, even though those statistics may not be relevant to all of the crime problems contained within that Lieutenant's PSA. The Committee encourages the MPD to evaluate personnel performance in ways that are consistent with the new directions being taken by the Department's overall performance measures.
The Committee believes that requesting MPD to evaluate its performance based on how it actually decreases drug related and quality of life type disorder crime is consistent with its mission to "prevent crime and fear of crime, and to work with others to build safe and healthy neighborhoods throughout the District of Columbia."
The Committee commends MPD for its recent enhancements to the Office of Professional Responsibility and the accompanying reduction in incidents of officers’ use of force. The Committee notes that Performance Measures 4.1 and 4.2, a 3% reduction in the number of excessive force allegations and a 3% reduction in the number of allegations of police misconduct, are indications that MPD intends to continue to monitor these important issues.
The Committee believes that monitoring police officers' court performance is an important part of tracking MPD’s overall performance and urges MPD to consider adding such monitoring to the work of the Court Liaison Division. The Committee also looks forward to monitoring implementation of the tracking system referenced by MPD in its response to questions from the Committee that will include a review of the final disposition of cases to determine whether prosecutions are successfully concluded, and, when not successful, to determine the reasons a conviction was not obtained.
The Committee looks forward to monitoring the MPD’s success in achieving its performance goal of a "majority of employees stating that ‘MPD is a good place to work." The Committee commends MPD for recognizing that employee satisfaction is directly related to quality service delivery.
The Committee looks forward to reviewing the results of MPD's evaluation of PSA staffing and boundaries referenced in its February 12, 2001 "Report to the Council of the District of Columbia on the Efficacy of the Police Service Area (PSA) Model." MPD testified in front of the Committee on March 23, 2001 that it would share the result of that evaluation, which is to be conducted with input from the community, with the Committee when it is completed.
The Committee also commends the following program enhancements planned for implementation in FY 2001 and FY 2002:
The proposed local budget is $297,027,000, an increase of $13,742,000, or 4.9%, over the FY 2001 revised budget. The Committee notes that if the FY 2001 supplemental budget passes in its current form, the FY 2002 increase in local funds will actually total only $2,942,000, or 1%, over the FY 2001 revised budget total when it includes the new supplemental funds. There are 4,353 FTEs funded by local sources, an increase of three from FY 2001. The increase in FTEs is associated with the transfer of 46 FTEs from Other funds to local funds, partially offset by a decrease of 43 FTEs associated with the Mayor’s $52 million management savings initiative in FY 2001.
The proposed total budget is $316,139,000, an increase of $10,692,000, or 3.5%, over the FY 2001 revised budget. There are 4,580 FTEs supported by this budget, 43 FTEs less than in FY 2001. These FTEs were eliminated as part of the Mayor’s $52 million management savings initiative.
The proposed other revenue budget is $8,142,644, a net decrease of $844,356 from the FY 2001 budget. Of this net decrease, a decrease of $2,705,456 is for personal services, and an increase of $1,861,100 is for non- personal services. The Other funds budget consists primarily of revenues collected through the E-911 service fee that is used to partially offset the operation and maintenance of the District’s 911 service, and donations from the community and other organizations to fund programs and activities. There are 25 FTEs funded by other sources, a decrease of 46 FTEs from FY 2001.
The proposed intra-district budget is $4,140,405, an increase of $686,405 over FY 2001. Of this increase, $653,453 is for personal services, and $32,952 is for non-personal services. There are two FTEs supported by Intra-District funds, no change from FY 2001.
There is no new proposed capital budget for FY 2002. MPD’s current program has six projects with funding of $46,299,000 for FY 2002 and total authority of $78,649,000 for FY 2002 through FY 2007. This program includes infrastructure improvements to address deferred maintenance needs and health safety issues as well as information technology initiatives and an equipment lease project to address the department’s need to replace police vehicles.
The Committee’s analysis of the MPD budget includes comprehensive reviews in these areas: the 2001 deficit; position control, promotions, and raises in non-patrol areas; FY 2002 increases that are not consistent with investing in frontline services; and persistent overtime issues. Discussions of each of these topics follows.
During the first quarter of FY 2001, MPD ran a deficit totaling approximately $10 million. Based on analysis of MPD’s budget for the past three years; testimony from representatives of MPD, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer and the Office of Budget and Planning; the Committee comes to this inescapable conclusion: the deficit occurred as a result of poor budget planning and execution and decisions on hiring, promotions, and salary increases that did not reflect the limitations of the District’s budget and financial plan.
MPD has historically overestimated the total number of FTEs it expected to have on board during a given fiscal year, particularly with respect to the total number of sworn officers. Doing so typically resulted in an excess of personal services funds, which MPD would in turn use to cover its total staffing and programmatic costs. For example, over the past several years, MPD has not reached its fully authorized and budgeted level of 3600 officers, but nevertheless has spent its total funds budgeted for personal services.
By June of 2000, however, MPD managed to recruit 3,600 total officers. During a hearing on January 12, 2001 on an issue related to MPD’s FY 2001 budget pressures, District Deputy Mayor Margret Kellems testified that "[d]uring the fiscal year 2001 budget formulation process, it was determined that MPDC would likely not meet and sustain its budgeted strength of 3,600 sworn officers." MPD has similarly commented that the success of its recruitment program in FY 2000 and FY 2001 was more rapid than expected. The Committee questions such statements when the Council and Mayor made the policy decision to budget funds specifically for 3,600 officers in FY 2000, and when MPD testified on February 14, 2000 that "our goal is to have 3,650 sworn officers by the end of FY 2000 and 3,800 officers by the end of FY 2001."
Nevertheless, MPD reached its full complement of 3,600 officers prior to the start of FY 2001. MPD has stated that reaching this number, combined with several unanticipated overtime expenses related to large events in FY 2000, resulted in a severe budget deficit for the agency by the beginning of FY 2001. The OCFO subsequently imposed a hiring freeze on the MPD.
The Committee believes that the reasoning behind the budgetary and programmatic planning that resulted in this deficit at best exemplifies questionable judgment and at worst nullifies deliberate policy decisions. The Committee regrets that the ultimate consequence of this poor budget planning is that halfway through FY 2001, the MPD’s considerable progress in recruitment and full sworn staffing over the past three years was lost because of the hiring freeze prompted by uncontrolled spending.
Despite these budget pressures, over the last two years the MPD appears to have hired individuals in violation of FTE ceilings, sometimes at exorbitant salaries, and to have given current FTEs costly promotions and salary increases. As part of its analysis of MPD’s FY 2002 Baseline Budget, the Office of Budget and Planning (OBP) commented that
There is a lack of position control within MPD. This is due primarily to the inability of the agency to maintain their Schedule A. As a result, staff is recruited above the agency FTE ceiling, promotions are made when a vacancy may not exist, salaries are excessive . . . OBP analysts recommend the agency’s Schedule A be updated and maintained regularly. Once complete, the agency should develop a staffing plan that adheres to the approved budget.
The Committee concurs with this assessment as, apparently, does Chief Ramsey. In testimony before the Committee on March 23, 2001, he acknowledged that the schedule A’s had not been "loaded" properly for a considerable period of time, and indicated that while progress has been made in this area as recently as the previous few weeks, more management oversight is needed.
The majority of MPD’s spending – 65% - is within the Regional Operations control center that includes patrol services. What has occurred with regard to personal services spending in the other 35% of the budget, however, appears to be a major cost driver. The Committee is particularly concerned by spending trends within the Chief of Police and Corporate Support control centers. A review of the MPD’s current Schedule A and payroll records for FY 2000 and FY 1999 reveal substantial increases in total salary levels within those control centers over the last two fiscal years. For example, within the Chief of Police control center, between FY 1999 and FY 2001, the office of the general counsel has experienced a 53% increase in salaries, corporate communications has experienced a 69% increase and the office of quality assurance has experienced a 28% increase. Within the Corporate Support control center, the human services office has experienced a 62% increase and the business services division has seen an increase of 23%.
One factor contributing to the jump in aggregate salaries was the implementation of the Management Supervisory Service (MSS), a key element of the Omnibus Personnel Reform Act of 1998. District-wide pay raises for mid-level to senior managers who became at-will employees were designed to achieve parity with federal counterparts at an average raise of 18%. The Committee acknowledges that implementation of the MSS is one factor, but does not explain the entirety of the personal services increases.
MPD’s inability to maintain its Schedule A, combined with the problems created by the FY 2001 deficit, have considerably complicated the FY 2002 budget process. The Committee’s review of MPD’s Schedule 40s, which reflect the revised FY 2001 budget versus the proposed FY 2002 budget of individual responsibility centers by comptroller source group, revealed large shifts of funds between control centers that are inconsistent with the Council’s policy of investing in MPD’s frontline services. These shifts appear to be made up primarily of decreases within the Regional Operations control center and increases within the personal services lines of the Chief of Police and Corporate Support control centers.
During the Committee’s March 23, 2001 budget oversight hearing, Chairperson Patterson asked MPD what programmatic enhancements or cuts were behind these shifts. MPD testified that the only programmatic enhancements or cuts contained in the MPD’s FY 2002 proposed budget were those contained in the Mayor’s proposed budget book and summarized at the beginning of this report: full funding for 3,800 police officers; non- personal services funding for the red light, photo radar and fleet maintenance contracts; a decrease in overtime spending, and so forth. The remainder of the increase, MPD testified, consisted of the funds necessary to align MPD’s budget with its recently updated Schedule A. The MPD’s CFO testified that the shifts contained in the Schedule 40s were a reflection of increases that had been made within certain responsibility centers in recent years but that had not necessarily been fully funded or reflected in MPD’s Schedule A until now. The bulk of the increase in MPD’s budget, then, consisted of the funds necessary to fully fund all of MPD’s existing FTEs.
The Committee regrets that the consequences of this delayed full accounting of MPD’s total FTEs is a proposed FY 2002 budget that appears to contain large, new increases in staff for the Chief of Police and Corporate Support control centers that in reality have already taken place. The following charts summarize the shifts contained within the Chief of Police and Corporate Support responsibility centers continuing full time pay lines (comptroller source group 0011) between FY 2000 and FY 2002:
|
Resp. Center |
FY 00 Budg |
FY 00 Exp |
FY 01 Realloc |
FY 2002 |
|
Chief of Police |
445 |
764 |
917 |
387 |
|
Chief of Staff |
92 |
95 |
148 |
108 |
|
General Counsel |
245 |
477 |
467 |
485 |
|
Office of Prof. Responsibility |
3042 |
$3,33 3 |
3056 |
3550 |
|
Chief Financial Officer |
2230 |
$1,84 4 |
1505 |
2021 |
|
Corporate Communication s |
439 |
538 |
394 |
773 |
|
Quality Assurance Group |
149 |
20 |
93 |
186 |
|
Strat. Planning |
4033 |
$2,68 0 |
1523 |
2783 |
|
Resp. Center |
FY 00 Budg |
FY 00 Exp |
FY 01 Reallo c |
FY 2002 |
|
Asst. Chief - Corp Support |
2080 |
721 |
2077 |
979 |
|
Human Serv. Section |
2451 |
3608 |
3156 |
3698 |
|
Business Serv. |
4964 |
5120 |
2261 |
5444 |
|
Training Serv. |
8722 |
$13,84 5 |
8014 |
16253 |
|
Oper. Serv. |
14768 |
$14,05 7 |
$13,26 1 |
14363 |
These charts are instructive for a number of reasons. First, they illustrate steady increases in continuing full time pay for the Chief of Police and Corporate Support control centers. Second, the comparison between the total budgeted for FY 2000 and the total actually expended in FY 2000 show the tendency for spending patterns to be inconsistent with the budget plan. Third, the trends in some responsibility centers, namely the office of the general counsel, strategic planning, human services, and business services, indicate that the proposed budget for FY 2002 is a more accurate reflection of what has actually been spent in the past (see FY2000 expenditure column) than what was budgeted for FY 2001. Hence what are characterized as increases in FY 2002 more accurately align the proposed budget with previous spending levels.
A similar chart for the three regional operations commands reveals how, in the past, underspending of budgets for sworn officers (note the difference between FY 2000 budgets and FY 2000 expenditures) resulted in budget surpluses that could then be used to cover overspending in other areas.
|
Resp Center |
FY 00 Budg |
FY 00 Exp |
FY 01 Realloc |
FY 2002 |
|
ROC North |
38968 |
35062 |
33099 |
37092 |
|
ROC Central |
60750 |
54671 |
54646 |
58959 |
|
ROC East |
39974 |
37254 |
47686 |
39326 |
The Committee also notes that there are uneven shifts across the three ROCs with respect to continuing full time pay for FY 2002. During the Committee’s March 23, 2001 budget oversight hearing, Chairperson Patterson asked about these shifts. Chief Ramsey testified that they were in no way reflections of MPD's deployment plans for each of the ROCs and suggested that the numbers were likely loaded wrong.
The Committee also noted several increases in the additional gross pay lines (comptroller source group 0013), which include overtime spending, in the Chief of Police and Corporate Support control centers. This is despite the fact that the Regional Operations control center contains considerable overtime decreases as a result of the policy directive contained in the Mayor's proposed FY 2002 budget that decreases overtime spending. The Committee acknowledges that comptroller source group 0013 includes spending related to shift differential pay, holiday pay, and so forth. The Committee's review of FY 2000 and FY 1999 spending in this category, however, did reveal the existence of considerable pure overtime spending (subcategory #133 within Source Group 0013) in what are administrative support functions.
The Committee requested and the Office of Budget and Planning provided details on the overtime spending for the Chief of Police and Corporate Support control centers for FY 1999 and FY 2000, breaking out the amount of overtime from the totals for additional gross pay. The actual spending on overtime (subcategory #133 within Source Group 0013) for the Chief of Police control center totalled $382,087 in FY 1999 and $296,018 in FY 2000. The total overtime spending in the Corporate Support control center totalled $1,950,295 in FY 1999 and $2,673,285 in FY 2000. The following charts indicate the amount budgeted for FY 2002 for additional gross pay in the two non-patrol control centers. OBP was unable to provide this information to the Committee at the subcategory level:
|
FY 2001 |
FY 2002 |
FY 2001 vs. FY 2002 |
|
|
Chief of Police Control Center |
693000 |
929000 |
235000 |
|
Chief of Police |
52000 |
48000 |
-$4,000 |
|
Chief of Staff |
6000 |
12000 |
6000 |
|
General Counsel |
15000 |
54000 |
40000 |
|
Office of Professional Responsibility |
240000 |
403000 |
163000 |
|
Chief Financial Officer |
124000 |
229000 |
104000 |
|
Corporate Communications |
28000 |
88000 |
59000 |
|
Quality Assurance |
0 |
21000 |
21000 |
|
Strategic Planning |
228000 |
74000 |
-$154,000 |
|
Corp. Support Control Center |
2265000 |
4005000 |
$1,739,00 0 |
|
Asst Chief, Corporate Support |
105000 |
110000 |
5000 |
|
Human Services |
174000 |
425000 |
251000 |
|
Business Services |
366000 |
611000 |
245000 |
|
Training Services |
670000 |
1150000 |
480000 |
|
Operational Services |
950000 |
1709000 |
758000 |
If the FY 2002 spending for overtime is consistent with the previous two completed fiscal years, MPD would be spending an estimated $2.1 million in overtime in the Corporate Support functions, and a total of $300,000 in the Chief of Police functions.
The Committee strongly recommends that MPD reconsider these shifts into pay lines for non-patrol oriented units and the amounts budgeted for overtime in administrative functions, including the very significant increases in this pay line at a time when budget policies assume reductions and savings in overtime in patrol functions.
The Committee also looks forward to an improved budget process from now on that will be consistent with budget policy passed by the Mayor and Council. To assist in this process, the Committee is recommending to the Committee of the Whole that line item language be inserted in the FY 2002 Budget Request Act to reserve no less than $173,000,000 for salaries for sworn officers.
The Committee is also encouraged by MPD's public commitment to keep its Schedule A current, and to OBP's plans to draft more detailed program-based budgeting for MPD for FY 2003. The Committee intends to conduct aggressive oversight on the implementation of MPD's FY 2002 budget and notes that it contains only an overall three FTE increase (which results from a transfer of 46 FTEs from Other funds to local funds minus the 43 FTEs MPD lost as part of the Mayor's $52 million savings initiative).
The Committee acknowledges that excessive use of overtime is a complicated issue that involves the practices of agencies beyond the Committee’s and the District’s jurisdiction. And it is the case that successful police investigations will require overtime efforts and compensation. Nevertheless, the Committee intends to use its oversight over the MPD to ensure that management and accounting tools are in place to resolve exorbitant spending related to overtime and to protect against instances of abuse.
The issue of MPD overtime spending is not new. In fact, the District has spent an inordinate amount of time and tax dollars over the last decade examining the issue and making recommendations on how to resolve abuse and overspending. A sampling of earlier reports and recommendations include:
In 1991, D.C. Auditor Otis H. Troupe issued a major report calling for policy changes to address both court and programmatic overtime, including prior approvals. The auditor found:
The D.C. Auditor made a long series of recommendations including preapproval of overtime; daily, weekly and/or annual limitations on overtime for MPD employees; and ongoing management and budget analysis and controls on overtime expenditures.
In 1993 the MPD Court Liaison Division undertook an investigation of irregularities in MPD court attendance records. While the investigation was prompted by actions of a particular officer, the review highlighted serious discrepancies in overtime reports made by members of the Department and the U.S. Attorney’s office. The report found that of 179 total appearances by 10 members of the Department, 90 appearances – all vouched for by an assistant U.S. attorney and compensated – occurred after the case was dismissed. In a second case the review found that of 200 appearances by nine MPD officers – also verified by an assistant U.S. attorney and compensated - - 182 occurred after dismissal. The report concluded: "The members [of the Department] involved have received D.C. government funds in the form of court overtime pay by engaging in activities that court overtime pay is not authorized" for in law or regulation.
In mid-1996 amid a rising homicide rate, then Chief of Police Larry Soulsby authorized "whatever overtime you deem appropriate and necessary to facilitate the closure and/or conviction rate for homicides." An internal study of homicide overtime the following spring found "a disproportionate distribution of overtime, particularly program overtime" that was most evident in two "task force" squads – the Safestreets and Cold Case squads. The variation in overtime demonstrated in the analysis "suggests that the controls on the use of overtime hours required at the inception of this program do not exist, or if they do, they are not rigorously adhered to."
In 1998, following a shake-up in the Department and Council testimony from MPD "whistleblowers" on continuing abuse of overtime and retaliatory action against members of the Department, the Council created the Special Committee on Police Misconduct and Personnel Management. One of six major issues reviewed by the Special Committee in its work was overtime. The Committee recommended "truth in budgeting" for overtime, continuing efforts to negotiate an "on-call" system for court overtime, and "strict adherence to the court overtime procedures" encompassed in a memorandum of understanding between the Department and the U.S. Attorney.
The most recent analysis of overtime issues was conducted by the Council for Court Excellence (CCE) and the Justice Management Institute (JMI). In December 1999, the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) commissioned the two to study the entire process of managing cases from arrest to judicial disposition to better understand the related resource implications on the MPD and other criminal justice agencies. The report, issued in March 2001, revealed that large numbers of MPD officers spend an enormous amount of time participating in judicial proceedings, and that a very small percentage of that time is actually spent testifying in court. Key findings of the study that relate directly to the MPD are:
The Committee recommends that the CJCC press member agencies to implement the CCE/JMI recommendations and looks forward to the CJCC’s development of a case management system for the D.C. Superior Court. The Committee also commends the MPD’s current and planned use of technology, including Live-Scan and video conferencing, that will ultimately increase the efficiency of its involvement in the prosecutorial process.
The Committee requests that, as part of the Committee’s ongoing oversight of the court overtime issue and as a follow-up to the CCE/JMI report, the MPD monitor and record the following statistics:
The studies enumerated here documented excessive overtime as a budget and management issue for the MPD, found possible evidence of fraudulent use of overtime by police officers, and made recommendations to curb excessive spending and abuse. Despite these efforts, overtime spending and suspected abuse have persisted.
In preparing for the March 7, 2001 Committee performance review of the Department, the Committee reviewed payroll records for 1999, 2000, and 2001 that revealed exorbitant use of court and programmatic overtime by police officers. The Committee is not opposed to police officers being compensated for productive work. The Committee believes that payroll records suggest that officers may be being compensated for an unrealistic number of hours. For example, the records indicate that several officers were paid 50-100% of their salaries in total overtime for the past three years.
Based on the documentation of excessive overtime prepared at the Committee’s request, both the Department and the Committee requested that the District’s Chief Financial Officer conduct an audit into MPD overtime spending. On March 22, 2001, the Office of the Inspector General assumed responsibility for the comprehensive audit with a report anticipated in the fall. The Committee will closely monitor the OIG investigation and any recommendations that ensue.
A major policy issue that emerged from the overtime records was the ongoing practice of virtually the entire command staff of MPD requesting and receiving overtime payments, an indication that the senior managers of the Department – with the Chief of Police as the sole exception – have not been considered salaried managers under the terms of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. In his FY 2002 budget submission, Mayor Williams proposed ending the practice of senior managers in MPD receiving overtime, and the Committee concurs with this proposal. The Committee proposed language be adopted in the Budget Support Act to preclude senior members of the command staff for both the Department and the Department of Fire/Emergency Medical Services from receiving overtime payments.
A final point on MPD overtime: The Committee commends the MPD for its work with the Office of the Corporation Counsel (OCC) on Papering Reform 2001, a pilot project underway in three police districts. This project allows MPD officers to use the WACIIS computer system to automate entry of arrest information and allows OCC prosecutors to make charging decisions based on the paper work submitted to them, rather than requiring that officers make in person appearances at the OCC offices for every arrest made. According to the CJCC, case papering accounts for 13-19% of the MPD’s total court-related overtime and compensatory time. The Committee is hopeful that the pilot project will result in time and budget savings for the MPD, and is encouraged by the United States Attorney’s commitment to engage in a similar effort with the MPD. In testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the District of Columbia April 4, 2001, U.S. Attorney Wilma Lewis pledged to work with MPD on papering reform, and also said her office would revisit the concept of a night court in conjunction with the D.C. Superior Court.
There is an immediate concern related to overtime received by members of the Fraternal Order of Police/Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee (FOP) that the Committee wishes to resolve during current budget process. The Committee recommends that the Metropolitan Police Department honor the April 11, 2000, decision by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS Case No. 99-09764) to award overtime compensation to members of the FOP consistent with the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in force between 1991 and February 1998. The amount of the award, estimated by the Chief Financial Officer, is $4.6 million, and the Committee recommends that the Council include this award amount in the FY 2001 Supplemental Appropriation pending before the Council. The Committee recommends that the amount be allocated from the Management Supervisory Service line in the proposed supplemental appropriation.
The background on this issue follows. Between 1991 and December 1996 members of the FOP received overtime under terms contained in its 1991 CBA. The terms of this agreement stated that "for the purpose of determining entitlement to compensatory time and overtime pay, all hours of work performed outside the basic work week and the basic work day shall be deemed overtime hours." The CBA further stated that "whenever a member of the bargaining unit is entitled to compensatory time off for overtime worked, he shall receive compensatory time at a rate of 1.5 hours of compensatory time for each hour of work performed."
On December 27, 1996, the D.C. Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority (control board) issued an order that reduced overtime compensation to the minimum authorized in the Fair Labor Standards Act, prohibiting overtime unless an individual worker has actually worked 40 hours in a given workweek. (The distinction is clearest when considering a work week that contains a legal holiday on a Monday. Under the CBA standard a worker receives overtime for Saturday work; under the FLSA definition the worker does not.) Two District labor organizations filed suit over the control board order. The University of the District of Columbia (UDC) Faculty Association and the American Federal of Government Employees (AFGE) filed separate lawsuits in U.S. District Court challenging the control board action. In both instances the Court held that the control board order was ultra vires because abrogating a contract exceeded the authority granted the control board by the Congress.
In January 1999 following the Court ruling in the UDC case, the FOP filed a grievance claiming that the Department violated the CBA by failing to pay overtime under the terms of the CBA and requesting the difference between the more generous CBA provisions in place in December 1996 and the less generous FLSA standards. (In February 1998 the FOP negotiated a new contract that incorporated the narrower FLSA standard for payment of overtime so that the additional compensation sought is for the period between the effective date of the control board order and the effective date of the 1998 CBA). The case moved to arbitration and the Arbitrator ruled April 11, 2000 that the control board did not have the authority to abrogate terms of the FOP CBA in force in December 1996.
On September 22, 2000, the U.S. District Court in the AFGE case ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding, as in the UDC case, that the control board action was ultra vires. Apparently at the request of the control board, the U.S. Congress adopted a provision in the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 that ratified the earlier control board action and made that order retroactive to December 27, 1996. The Act was signed November 2, 2000. On November 27 the control board filed a motion to dismiss the AFGE case. On February 15, 2001, the U.S. District Court issued a memorandum granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the AFGE case.
At issue, now, is whether the arbitration decision in the FOP case is nullified by the action of the Congress and the dismissal of the AFGE case. Underlying issues are whether the arbitration award was a final action, and whether the award meets the test of a vested right that even the Congress may not nullify. The Office of the Corporation Counsel has held in a draft opinion that the arbitration award was not final and that, thus, the Congress could act to remove the right of union members to the award. The Committee is not persuaded by the Corporation Counsel argument and, particularly, takes exception with the OCC view that the arbitration award was not a "final action." In fact, and the OCC draft notes this fact, when the arbitrator decision was rendered the MPD declined to appeal that decision to the Public Employee Relation Board, thereby ending the possibility of an appeal by the defendant. It is the view of the Committee that the award was, therefore, "final" and not subject to reversal by Congress.
Beyond the legalities, it is also the view of the Committee that the District is and should be bound by agreements into which it enters voluntarily - including each one of the collective bargaining agreements affected by the control board and Congressional actions. Unlike the control board and the Congress, the executive and legislative branches of the District government have an ongoing relationship with the collective bargaining units representing District workers, and are bound to respect the process of arbitration. The Committee fully expects the Courts to eventually find in favor of the labor organizations, assuming the labor unions continue to press their rights before the courts. Therefore, the Committee recommends that the MPD honor the arbitration award consistent with the Committee's recommendation to the Committee of the Whole at the conclusion of this report.
To assist in its benchmarking research, the Committee examined spending on police departments in three cities of comparable size to the District of Columbia - Boston, Massachusetts; Denver, Colorado; and Seattle, Washington.
|
City |
Total Local Funds FY 2001 (all $ in 000s) |
Total # FTEs FY 2001 |
|
District of Columbia (Population 570,0000) |
283285 |
4350 |
|
Boston, MA (Population 589,000) |
213446 |
3176 |
|
Denver, CO (Population 555,000) |
139537 |
1763 |
|
Seattle, WA (Population 563,000) |
153268 |
1893 |
The Committee notes that the District spends more total local dollars on MPD and has more total police department FTEs (sworn and civilian) than each of the three cities. The Committee intends to pursue this kind of benchmarking in more detail during Council Period 14, not just in terms of funding and FTE levels, but also in terms of crime reduction rates and other performance measures. For the purposes of its current budget oversight, however, the Committee is confident that MPD has sufficient resources to accomplish its mission in FY 2002, based on this limited research.
In addition to FY 2001 budget information, the Committee also surveyed several cities of similar population sizes as the District regarding how many police officers they assign to mayoral security details. The Committee surveyed Boston, Massachusetts; Denver, Colorado, and Seattle, Washington. The table below shows current population and mayoral security detail figures for each of these cities and the District of Columbia.
|
City |
Population per 2000 Census |
Composition of Mayoral Security Detail |
|
Washington, DC |
572059 |
19 (3 teams of 5, supervised by a sergeant. 1 Lieutenant oversees entire unit) |
|
Boston, MA |
589141 |
4 (usually only one driver, sometimes more than 1 officer will escort Mayor) |
|
Denver, CO |
554636 |
6 (5 detectives, supervised by a sergeant) |
|
Seattle, WA |
563374 |
2 officers |
The Committee notes that the size of the mayoral security detail in the District is more than three times larger than that of the next largest detail for any of the cities surveyed. While the unique role of the District as the nation's capital may explain some of this disparity, the Committee believes that the size of the Mayor's security detail remains far out of line with that of other jurisdictions. The Committee is pleased to note, however, that the FY 2002 budget request for the MPD reflects a reduction of 5 FTEs and $404,000 in the executive security line item.
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