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Committee
on Government Operations Public Oversight Hearing on "The D.C.
Inspector General's Term of Office and
Residency"
Testimony of Milou Carolan, Director, D.C. Office of Personnel
January 17, 2001
Good afternoon Chairman
Orange and members of the Committee on Government Operations. I am Milou
Carolan, Director of Personnel, and I have been asked today to testify
about two items: the term of the current Inspector General and the
residency requirements associated with the position of Inspector General.
Term of the
Current Inspector General
I understand that
members of the Committee have received copies of my letter dated November
15, 2001 to Ms. Brookins-Hudson in which I responded to her question
concerning the term of the current Inspector General, Mr. Maddox. As I
stated in that letter, the personnel forms associated with Mr. Maddox's
appointment and Mayor's Order 99-81, dated May 20, 1999, are silent as to
the Inspector General's term. From my review of the available facts and
information, I am confident that the intent of the Executive and the
Financial Authority was to offer Mr. Maddox a full six-year term, in
accordance with D.C. Official Code § 2302.08.
Since Mr. Maddox's
appointment was made in a Control Year, the process was subject to the
requirements of § 2-302.08 (B) of the D.C. Official Code, which I have
attached to my testimony. In a Control Year, the Mayor was required to
notify the Council and Authority of his nomination and the nomination was
effective upon approval by a majority vote of the Authority. Therefore, as
I indicated to Ms. Brookins-Hudson, it is my opinion that Mr. Maddox's
term as inspector General began in May 1999 and extends through May 2005.
Residency
Requirements
The position of
Inspector General is in the Executive Service and the residency
requirement provisions for Executive Service positions are specified in
the D.C. Official Code § 1-610.59 and Chapter 3 of the District Personnel
Manual (DPM). Appointees to the Executive Service are required to
establish D.C. residency within 180 days of appointment and maintain their
D.C. residency for the duration of their employment. The D.C. Office of
Personnel notifies individuals of this requirement and requires that they
provide at least four proofs of residency.
Personnel actions for
the Office of the Inspector General are processed by the D.C. Office of
Personnel. In reviewing Mr. Maddox's personnel file, we found that he
provided the required proofs of residency within the time period required.
By submitting the required proofs, an employee acknowledges the
applicability of the residency requirement and asserts his or her
adherence to the District's residency rules.
Residency waivers in the Executive Service can only be granted via
statute, with approval by the D.C. Council and the Mayor. As you may
know, the only member of the Executive Service with a statutory
exemption from the residency requirement is Chief Technology Officer
Suzanne Peck. All other members of the Executive Service are subject to
the residency requirement.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have.
Back to top of page
Statement of Daniel A. Rezneck
My name is Daniel A. Rezneck. I served as General Counsel to the District
of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority
("the Authority") from its creation by Congress in 1995 in
Public Law 104-8 until the Authority suspended its activities by operation
of law on September 30, 2001. I am presently a Senior Counsel in the
Office of the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia. I am a
member of the bars of the District of Columbia and the State of New York.
I am familiar with the appointment of Charles C. Maddox as Inspector
General of the District of Columbia. Mr. Maddox was appointed under the
same statute, Public Law 104-8, which created the Authority. Section 303
of Public Law 104-8 provided that the Inspector General should serve a
six-year term. The Act provided for nomination by the Mayor of the
District of Columbia and confirmation by the Authority during a
"control year." The Council of the District of Columbia was
given no statutory role in the appointment process other than one of
consultation with the Mayor and the Authority. Mr. Maddox was nominated by
the Mayor on May 20, 1999. There are no words of limitation as to his term
in the order nominating him. He was unanimously confirmed by the Authority
on May 26, 1999. There are no words of limitation as to his term in the
Resolution of the Authority confirming him. 1999 was a "control
year." The appointment of Mr. Maddox was for a full six-year term in
accordance with Public Law 104-8.
As indicated, neither the Mayor's nomination nor the Authority's
confirmation of Mr. Maddox referred to the length of his term. There was
no need to do so. The statute is explicit on the length of the term of the
Inspector General-six years. I drafted the confirmation Resolution of the
Authority. It never occurred to me that anyone would question or doubt
that Mr. Maddox' appointment was for a full six-year term. I am confident
that the members of the Authority had the same understanding that I did-Mr.
Maddox was appointed for a full six-year term.
I have recently seen for the first time the "sense of the
Council" resolution of May 20,1999, which purportedly
"confirms" the appointment of Mr. Maddox "for a term to end
January 15, 2002." I have the following comments on this resolution:
- It was and is of no legal effect. During 1999, a "control
year", the power of confirmation of the Inspector General was
lodged exclusively in the Authority by Public Law 104-8. As I have
indicated, the Council had no role other than a consultative one.
- Furthermore, this resolution was never formally transmitted to the
Authority. Section 3 of the resolution recites that the Council
"shall transmit a copy of this resolution, upon its adoption,
each to the nominee and to the Office o the Mayor."
- Had I been made aware of the Council's purported
"confirmation" of Mr. Maddox for a term purporting to end
January 15, 2002, 1 would simply have redrafted the Authority
Resolution to spell out that the appointment was for the full six-year
term and I would have recommended to the Authority that it adopt the
Resolution as redrafted. I am confident that the Authority would have
done so.
- Mr. Maddox was the fourth person nominated as Inspector General
during the tenure of the Authority. The first appointee during a
"control year", Ms. Angela Avant, resigned after a brief
period in office. The second nominee was not confirmed by the
Authority. The third, E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., served with
distinction for slightly more than a year, pursuant to his own wishes.
The last thing the Authority wanted in 1999 was another "short
termer" as Inspector General. As reflected in the Authority's
Resolution confirming Mr. Maddox, it determined that he was
"eminently qualified to fill this vital position by reason of his
background, training, experience, temperament, character, integrity,
and demonstrated ability in public administration and
investigations." The Authority had found the right man for the
job of Inspector General, an independent office and one of the pillars
of the structure established by Congress in Public Law 104-8 for the
recovery and reform of the District government.
- Subjecting Mr. Maddox to another appointment process after only two
and a half years in office would be inconsistent with the plain
language of the statute, with the purpose of Congress in creating the
office, and with the purpose of the Authority in confirming Mr.
Maddox.
Back to top of page
I asked to testify briefly today because I thought it might be helpful to
the Council to have my recollection of the events surrounding my own
appointment as Inspector General of the District of Columbia in January
1998 and the appointment of my successor, Charles Maddox.
In December 1997, 1 was approached by City leaders and asked to take on
the job of Inspector General because of a series of events that had led to
a crisis of confidence in the Police Department. I would be taking the
place of an Inspector General who had never been confirmed.
Nothing was said to me at the time - by the then Mayor, by any member
of the City Council, or by any member of the Control Board - about filling
an unexpired term. On the contrary, everyone assumed that I was being
appointed to the six-year term called for in the governing statute, even
though both I and the City leaders knew that I did not intend to serve the
entire term.
The point is that the choice was mine, as evidenced by the fact that I
first agreed to serve for six months and then extended that to one year
and finally to fifteen months.
Moreover, if anyone had intended me to fill an unexpired term, it would
have been difficult to know what that term was, since, as I say, my
predecessor in the office had never been confirmed.
When I resigned to return to private practice, I was actively involved
in recommending and promoting the appointment of Charles Maddox, who had
been my chief deputy when I was Inspector General. I attended any number
of meetings with City officials, both with and without Mr. Maddox,
introducing him or describing his qualifications.
Again, I never heard a single comment by anyone to the effect that Mr.
Maddox would be appointed to an unexpired term. On the contrary, I
certainly assumed, and I am sure that Mr. Maddox did too, that he would be
appointed to the full, statutory, six-year term.
I feel rather strongly that if someone is being appointed to an
unexpired term rather than a full term, that ought to be made clear to the
candidate, because it could well affect his or her decision whether to
accept the position.
Thus, putting aside the legalities of the matter, it seems to me more
than unfair to suggest to Mr. Maddox at this stage that he was really not
appointed and confirmed for six years, as the statute says, but for only
two-and-a-half years.
But in addition to the equities, I think the law is clear. Congress
intended the six-year term to be an integral part of the independence it
was insisting upon for the Inspector General. Any cutback in that term,
for whatever reason, should be explicit and fully supported by legal
underpinnings, which I do not believe to exist here.
I have recently been made aware of the Council's "Sense of the
Council on the Inspector General of the District of Columbia Charles C.
Maddox Confirmation Emergency Resolution of 1999." First, I knew
nothing about this Resolution when it was passed. More importantly, this
Resolution, as it says, merely expressed the sense of the Council and was
in no way binding, because the statute providing for the appointment of
the Inspector General in a control year specified that the appointment
would be made by the Mayor and approved by the Control Board, and would
last for six years unless the Inspector General was removed for cause.
In summary, I believe that both legally and in fairness, Mr. Maddox is
currently serving a full, six-year term as Inspector General of the
District of Columbia.
Back to top of page
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES MADDOX, ESQ.
INSPECTOR GENERAL
BEFORE THE D.C. COUNCIL
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT HEARING ON
"THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S INSPECTOR GENERAL'S TERM OF OFFICE AND
PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE"
THURSDAY, JANUARY 17, 2002
GOOD AFTERNOON CHAIRMAN ORANGE AND COUNCIL MEMBERS. I APPRECIATE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY TODAY TO PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT I BELIEVE WILL
ASSIST IN RESOLVING QUESTIONS THAT YOU HAVE ABOUT THE LENGTH OF MY TERM OF
OFFICE AND MY RESIDENCY IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. I RECOGNIZE THAT THE
ISSUES BEFORE US TODAY ARE NOT ONLY IMPORTANT TO THIS COUNCIL, BUT ALSO TO
THE CITIZENS OF THE DISTRICT, WHO MAY BE VIEWING THIS HEARING ON CABLE TV.
IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ALL CONCERNED CITIZENS TO KNOW THAT I AM HELD
ACCOUNTABLE FOR MY ACTIONS, JUST AS I HOLD OTHERS ACCOUNTABLE IN MY
CAPACITY AS INSPECTOR GENERAL.
TERM OF OFFICE
I WILL FIRST ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE SIX-YEAR TERM OF OFFICE FOR
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL BEGINS WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF EACH NEW INDIVIDUAL
TO THAT POSITION OR, STATED ANOTHER WAY, WHETHER MY TERM AS THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ENDED TWO DAYS AGO, ON JANUARY
15,2002, AS STATED IN A MAY 20, 1999, COUNCIL RESOLUTION. IT IS MY
POSITION THAT MY TERM HAS NOT EXPIRED FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, CONGRESS
INTENDED THE LENGTH OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL TERM TO RUN WITH THE
INDIVIDUAL AND NOT THE OFFICE. SECOND, THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION IS NOT
BINDING ON MY APPOINTMENT OR THE EXPIRATION OF MY TERM BECAUSE IT WAS
ENTERED DURING A CONTROL PERIOD.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AS WELL AS THE CLEAR MEANING OF THE LANGUAGE OF
THE IG STATUTE SUPPORTS THIS INTERPRETATION. IN 1995, CONGRESS AMENDED THE
IG STATUTE BY INCREASING THE TERM OF OFFICE FOR THE IG FROM FOUR TO SIX
YEARS AND BY PROHIBITING THE D.C. COUNCIL FROM CHANGING THE IG'S BUDGET.
CONGRESS MADE THESE CHANGES IN PUBLIC LAW 104-8 TO SET A "FIXED"
SIX-YEAR TERM FOR THE DISTRICT'S INSPECTOR GENERAL AND TO ENSURE THAT
"THE IG HAS THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO
ACT AS A STRONG WATCHDOG OVER THE CITY GOVERNMENT." 141 CONG. REC.
H4067 (DAILY ED. APR. 3, 1995) (STATEMENT OF REP. DAVIS). AS A RESULT, THE
TERM OF THE SITTING IG NO LONGER COINCIDES WITH THAT OF THE MAYOR WHO
APPOINTED HIM/HER, AND THIS INDIVIDUAL MAY ONLY BE REMOVED BY THE
APPOINTING MAYOR - OR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION - FOR CAUSE.
THIS EFFORT TO MAKE SURE THE TERMS DO NOT COINCIDE INTENTIONALLY
CREATES A SITUATION WHEREBY THE IG SERVES AT LEAST TWO YEARS INTO ANOTHER
MAYORAL TERM. THE EFFECT IS THAT THE IG CONTINUES TO SERVE A NEW OR
RE-ELECTED MAYOR, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE MAYOR'S POSSIBLE DESIRE TO REPLACE
HIM. ON A FUNDAMENTAL LEVEL, THE IG IS GUARANTEED INDEPENDENCE TO CONDUCT
HIS WORK TWO YEARS INTO THE MAYOR'S TERM, WITHOUT CONCERN ABOUT
RETRIBUTION AND WITH THE BENEFIT OF BEING ABLE TO IMPACT DISTRICT AFFAIRS
THROUGH CONSISTENT LEADERSHIP.
FURTHERMORE, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW 104-8 REVEALS
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO GRANT THE AUTHORITY TO APPROVE INSPECTOR GENERAL
APPOINTMENTS TO THE CONTROL BOARD ALONE DURING A CONTROL YEAR. INDEED, THE
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT WAS TO PROVIDE COUNCIL WITH A ROLE OF "LIMITED
REVIEW" IN THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS. H.R. REP. NO. 104-96, AT 49
(1995). IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PROCESS, THE CONTROL BOARD VOTED TO
APPROVE MY APPOINTMENT AS THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AND SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED A
RESOLUTION ON MAY 26, 1999, GIVING MY APPOINTMENT IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT I WAS APPOINTED
TO FILL THE VACANCY LEFT BY E. BARRETT PRETTYMAN, JR. IN 1999. AS YOU ARE
AWARE, MR. PRETTYMAN WAS APPOINTED BY FORMER MAYOR MARION BARRY IN 1998 AS
THE DISTRICT'S INSPECTOR GENERAL. MR. PRETTYMAN WAS APPOINTED TO A
SIX-YEAR TERM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSPECTOR GENERAL STATUTE; THEREFORE,
IF HE HAD SERVED OUT HIS FULL TERM, HIS APPOINTMENT WOULD HAVE EXPIRED ON
JANUARY 15, 2004.
SIMILARLY, IN 1999, I WAS APPOINTED AS THE INSPECTOR GENERAL BY MAYOR
WILLIAMS. THIS APPOINTMENT WAS PURSUANT TO THAT SAME STATUTE, PRESENTLY
CODIFIED AT D.C. CODE, 2001 ED. § 2-302.08 (IG STATUTE). THEN AND NOW,
THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE IG STATUTE INDICATES THAT THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S
6-YEAR TERM RUNS WITH THE INDIVIDUAL. THE LANGUAGE READS AS FOLLOWS:
"THE OFFICE SHALL BE HEADED BY AN INSPECTOR GENERAL . . . WHO
(EMPHASIS ADDED) SHALL SERVE A TERM OF 6 YEARS AND SHALL BE SUBJECT TO
REMOVAL ONLY FOR CAUSE BY THE MAYOR (WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE AUTHORITY IN A
CONTROL YEAR)." D.C. CODE, 2001 § 2-302.08 (a)(1)(A). (EMPHASIS
ADDED)
THE TERM OF EACH INSPECTOR GENERAL IS SIX YEARS. UNLIKE OTHER DISTRICT
STATUTES THAT SET TERMS OF OFFICE, THE IG STATUTE CONTAINS NO QUALIFYING
LANGUAGE INDICATING THAT IF A VACANCY OCCURS PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF AN
IG'S TERM, THEN THE INCUMBANT MAY ONLY SERVE THE REMAINING PERIOD OF THAT
TERM. ACCORDINGLY, MY TERM EXPIRES IN MAY 2005, SUBJECT TO REAPPOINTMENT.
TO FURTHER CLARIFY THIS ISSUE, I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT, BECAUSE
I WAS APPOINTED DURING A CONTROL YEAR, THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL IN MY
APPOINTMENT WAS STATUTORILY LIMITED SOLELY TO TWO AREAS: 1) CONSULTATION
WITH THE MAYOR ON THE NOMINATION, AND, 2) NOTIFICATION TO THE COUNCIL BY
THE MAYOR OF THE NOMINATION. AS YOU WELL KNOW, I SHARE THE COUNCIL'S
DESIRE FOR INCREASED HOME RULE FOR THE DISTRICT NOW AND IN THE FUTURE.
HOWEVER, THE FACT REMAINS THAT MY NOMINATION DURING A CONTROL YEAR WAS
SUBJECT ONLY TO THE APPROVAL OF THE CONTROL BOARD. CONSEQUENTLY, NONE OF
THE COUNCIL'S ACTIONS - APPROVAL OR OPINION REGARDING MY TERM OF OFFICE -
WERE BINDING. THE CONTROL BOARD, SUPPORTED BY THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE
FEDERAL STATUTE, CLEARLY INTENDED ME TO SERVE A SIXYEAR TERM.
A JANUARY 10, 2002, WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE QUOTES YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN,
AS STATING THAT, DESPITE THE OPINION OF THE COUNCIL'S OWN GENERAL COUNSEL,
"[T]HE LEGAL ANALYSIS DOESN'T DISPEL THE FACT THAT THE CONTROL BOARD
APPROVED THE NOMINATION OF MADDOX AND THE TERM AS INDICATED IN THE
COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION." (EMPHASIS ADDED). RESPECTFULLY, MR. CHAIRMAN,
THIS OBSERVATION IS FLAWED FOR TWO REASONS.
FIRST, THE CONTROL BOARD'S RESOLUTION DID NOT APPROVE THE TERM AS
INDICATED IN THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION. ON ITS FACE, THE RESOLUTION
ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE COUNCIL APPROVED MY NOMINATION. HOWEVER, IT IS
IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE CONTROL BOARD'S RESOLUTION DOES NOT REFER TO,
ADOPT, RATIFY, OR INCORPORATE THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION. IN FACT, DANIEL
REZNECK, WHO WAS GENERAL COUNSEL FOR THE CONTROL BOARD AT THE TIME, AND
WHO DRAFTED THE CONTROL BOARD'S RESOLUTION HAS INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD NO
KNOWLEDGE OF THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION. DESPITE LANGUAGE IN THE COUNCIL'S
RESOLUTION STATING THAT THE COUNCIL WAS TO PROVIDE ALL THE NOMINEES A COPY
OF THE RESOLUTION UPON ITS ADOPTION, I ALSO HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE
COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION UNTIL IT WAS SENT TO ME, BY YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, ON
OCTOBER 25, 2001.
SECOND, AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION IS NOT A
DETERMINING FACTOR IN THE IG'S APPOINTMENT OR THE EXPIRATION OF THE IG'S
TERM BECAUSE IT WAS ISSUED IN A CONTROL YEAR.
THE COUNCIL'S ACTION TO LIMIT THE DURATION OF MY APPOINTMENT TO THE
REMAINDER OF MY PREDECESSOR'S TERM DID NOT AND CANNOT OVERRIDE THE
STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF THE CONTROL BOARD TO APPROVE MY APPOINTMENT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNEQUIVOCAL LANGUAGE OF THE IG STATUTE. FURTHERMORE,
MR. CHAIRMAN, YOUR INTERPRETATION IS NOT SUPPORTED IN ANY OTHER PUBLIC
DOCUMENT. THE CONTROL BOARD OMITTED ANY LANGUAGE REGARDING A "NOT TO
EXCEED DATE"; THE MAYOR'S ORDER ANNOUNCING MY APPOINTMENT DID NOT
SUGGEST ANYTHING OTHER THAN A SIX-YEAR TERM; AND MY PERSONNEL PAPERWORK IS
NOT DISPOSITIVE, GIVEN THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT'S
INSPECTOR GENERAL WAS ALREADY FEDERALLY MANDATED.
RESIDENCY
I WILL NOW ADDRESS THE FACT THAT I AM A DISTRICT RESIDENT AND HAVE BEEN A
DISTRICT RESIDENT SINCE MY APPOINTMENT AS INSPECTOR GENERAL. IN THE LETTER
SENT TO ME BY YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, TO GIVE NOTIFICATION ABOUT THIS HEARING,
YOU EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT MY RESIDENCY, CITING A DECEMBER 10, 2001,
WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE REPORTING THAT "DISTRICT PROPERTY RECORDS
INDICATE THAT [I] OWN TWO CONDOMINIUMS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA [THAT]
ARE LISTED AS `NON-OWNER OCCUPIED."' IN ADDITION, THE ARTICLE STATES
THAT PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY PROPERTY RECORDS LIST MY HOME IN UPPER
MARLBORO AS MY PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE. YOU ALSO CITED A DECEMBER 27, 2001,
WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE REPORTING THAT I "POSSESS PRINCIPAL
RESIDENCES IN MARYLAND AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA."
WHILE THE ABOVE DETAILS CONCERNING THE HOMES THAT I OWN ARE NOT
INCORRECT, THEY ALSO ARE NOT HELPFUL IN ASSESSING THE UNDERLYING FACTS
THAT TRULY REPRESENT THE NATURE OF MY RESIDENCY AND DOMICILE - WHICH, FOR
THE RECORD, ARE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. PERHAPS THE MOST DIRECT WAY
TO PRESENT THOSE FACTS IN THE PROPER CONTEXT IS FOR ME TO SIMPLY TELL YOU
THE STORY OF HOW I OBTAINED AND USED THOSE PROPERTIES OVER THE PAST YEARS.
WHILE RESIDING IN THE WASHINGTON AREA AS A UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
AGENT IN 1980, MY WIFE AND I PURCHASED A TRACT OF FARMLAND IN PRINCE
GEORGES COUNTY, MARYLAND, WHERE WE LATER BUILT A HOME THAT BECAME OUR
PRIMARY RESIDENCE. IN 1996, WHILE EMPLOYED AS IG FOR THE PEACE CORPS, MY
WIFE AND I PURCHASED TWO CONDOMINIUMS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WHICH WE
INITIALLY INTENDED TO USE AS RENTAL PROPERTIES. BECAUSE WE CONSIDERED
THESE PROPERTIES AS INVESTMENTS AT THE TIME OF PURCHASE, THE TAX
RECORDATION DOCUMENTS TO BOTH REFLECT THAT THEY WERE NOT OWNER-OCCUPIED.
AT OR AROUND THIS TIME, WHILE SERVING AS THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
PEACE CORPS IN WASHINGTON, I QUICKLY REALIZED THAT THE DEMANDS OF THIS
POSITION WOULD, ON A FREQUENT BASIS, REQUIRE MY PRESENCE NEARBY. FOR THAT
REASON, I NEVER USED THE LARGER OF THE TWO CONDOMINIUMS AS A RENTAL
PROPERTY. INSTEAD, I RETAINED IT EXCLUSIVELY FOR MY PERSONAL USE. DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THIS CONDO HAS NEVER BEEN OCCUPIED BY ANYONE OTHER THAN
MEMBERS OF MY IMMEDIATE FAMILY, I SIMPLY DID NOT THINK OF UPDATING THE
"NON-OWNER OCCUPIED" NOTATION ON THE TAX RECORDS FOR THAT UNIT.
I PLAN TO CORRECT THIS OVERSIGHT.
I SHOULD NOTE THAT, WHILE THAT OMISSION HAS CREATED SOME OF THE
CONFUSION THAT THIS COMMITTEE IS ADDRESSING TODAY, IT HAS NOT RESULTED IN
THE LOSS OF TAX REVENUE FOR THE DISTRICT. IN FACT, IT WAS NOT UNTIL YOU
RAISED THIS ISSUE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT I REALIZED THAT MY TAX RATE ACTUALLY
WOULD HAVE BEEN LOWER HAD I MADE THE CHANGE. FURTHERMORE, I WOULD LIKE TO
NOTE THAT THE ISSUE AT HAND INVOLVES MY OVERSIGHT IN CONDUCTING AN
IMPORTANT ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION. THE ISSUE IS NOT ABOUT WHETHER I
PURCHASED PROPERTY IN DC AFTER BECOMING IG, FOR THE SIMPLE PURPOSE OF
MEETING THE DISTRICT RESIDENCY LAW REQUIREMENTS. TO THE CONTRARY, I
ALREADY OWNED AND WAS USING THE DISTRICT PROPERTY (WHILE WORKING AT THE
PEACE CORPS), AND SIMPLY FAILED TO CHANGE THE RECORDS TO REFLECT MY
PRINCIPAL RESIDENCY IN THE DISTRICT. LET ME EXPLAIN.
WHEN I RETIRED FROM FEDERAL SERVICE IN ORDER TO BECOME THE GENERAL
COUNSEL FOR THE DISTRICT'S INSPECTOR GENERAL, E. BARRETT PRETTYMAN, I WAS
NOT REQUIRED TO BE A DISTRICT RESIDENT. HOWEVER, WHEN I WAS OFFICIALLY
APPOINTED INSPECTOR GENERAL IN MAY OF 1999, I IMMEDIATELY TOOK THE LEGAL
STEPS NECESSARY TO CHANGE MY RESIDENCY FROM MARYLAND TO THE DISTRICT.
IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL, I WAS TOLD THAT THE THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR PROOF OF "BONA FIDE RESIDENCY" ARE CLEARLY SET
FORTH IN CHAPTER 3 OF THE D.C. PERSONNEL REGULATIONS. SECTION 305 OF THIS
CHAPTER REQUIRES A SHOWING OF AT LEAST FOUR CIRCUMSTANCES OR DOCUMENTS TO
SUPPORT A CLAIM OF BONA FIDE DISTRICT RESIDENCY. I WILL SHOW HOW I
FULFILL, NOT FOUR, BUT MANY MORE OF THESE REQUIREMENTS.
- MY HOME ADDRESS IS IN WASHINGTON, DC.
- I RECEIVE MY MAIL AT MY RESIDENCE IN THE DISTRICT AND AT THE UPPER
MARLBORO ADDRESS WHERE MY WIFE STILL MAINTAINS A PRINCIPAL RESIDENT
STATUS. SINCE THE VERY BEGINNING OF MY AGE, MY WIFE AND I HAVE SHARED
JOINT OWNERSHIP OF ALL OF OUR ASSETS - INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHING OF A
SINGLE JOINT BANKING ACCOUNT.
- I AM REGISTERED TO VOTE ONLY IN THE DISTRICT, AND HAVE VOTED IN
EVERY ELECTION SINCE CHANGING MY LEGAL RESIDENCE.
- THE AUTOMOBILES THAT I USE REGULARLY ARE BOTH REGISTERED AND INSURED
IN THE DISTRICT. I OWN A TRUCK USED PRIMARILY ON MY FARM IN MARYLAND.
IT IS REGISTERED IN MARYLAND, AND WAS PURCHASED PRIOR TO MY
APPOINTMENT AS INSPECTOR GENERAL.
- I HAVE A DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DRIVERS LICENSE, AND NO OTHERS.
- BOTH DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND FEDERAL INCOME TAXES ARE DEDUCTED FROM
MY WAGES AND FILED WITH THE DISTRICT'S DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND
REVENUE AND THE U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE.
- AS NOTED BEFORE, I PURCHASED MY CURRENT RESIDENCE IN 1996.
- I HAVE MADE MORTGAGE PAYMENTS SINCE 1996. THESE HAVE BEEN PAID SINCE
1996.
EVEN THOUGH I HAVE MORE THAN ONE RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY, IT HAS BEEN MY
INTENT AS THE INSPECTOR GENERAL TO MAKE THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MY
"ACTUAL, REGULAR, AND PRINCIPAL PLACE OF OCCUPANCY", AS REQUIRED
BY DC LAW (DC Code, 2001 Ed. § 1-6031(15)); AND I BELIEVE I HAVE DONE SO.
FURTHERMORE, I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE DISTRICT'S
RESIDENCY REGULATIONS DO NOT REQUIRE ME TO LIQUIDATE PROPERTY HOLDINGS IN
OTHER STATES. THEY DO NOT RESTRICT ME FROM VISITING THOSE PROPERTIES AT MY
DISCRETION, NOR DO THEY REQUIRE THAT ANY MEMBER OF MY FAMILY SPEND ALL OF
HIS OR HER TIME WITHIN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. IN FACT, THE ACTIVITIES
OF MY WIFE AND ADULT SON ARE NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THE DETERMINATION OF MY
RESIDENCY.
LET ME CLOSE BY SAYING THAT I BELIEVE IT IS COMPLETELY APPROPRIATE FOR
THIS COUNCIL TO REQUIRE ME TO PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION IF THERE EVER ARE
QUESTIONS THAT GO TO THE HEART OF WHETHER I AM SERVING THE APPROPRIATE
TERM OF OFFICE OR WHETHER I AM COMPLYING WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF
THIS CITY. THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION ABOUT SOMETHING AS FUNDAMENTAL AS
TO THE TERM OF MY SERVICE, AND I BELIEVE THAT I SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO
COMPLY WITH THE LAW, NO LESS - AND ARGUABLY, EVEN MORE - THAN OTHER
DISTRICT OFFICIALS.
IT IS MY FERVENT HOPE AND EXPECTATION THAT THIS HEARING WILL HELP US TO
CLARIFY AND PRESENT THE FACTS - ACCURATELY AND IN CONTEXT - SO THAT WE ALL
CAN MOVE ON TO FOCUS OUR ATTENTION ON OTHER IMPORTANT MATTERS AFFECTING
THE DISTRICT'S BUSINESS.
THAT CONCLUDES MY TESTIMONY, AND I WILL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER QUESTIONS OR
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AT THIS TIME. |
